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Macleod: Finding Original Public Meaning

FINDING ORIGINAL PUBLIC MEANING
James A. Macleod*
Textualists seek to interpret statutes consistent with their
“original public meaning” (OPM). To find it, they ask an
avowedly empirical question: how would ordinary readers have
understood the statute’s terms at the time of their enactment?
But as the Supreme Court’s decision in Bostock v. Clayton
County highlights, merely asking an empirical question doesn’t
preclude interpretive controversy. In considering how Title VII
applies to LGBT people, the Bostock majority and dissents
vehemently disagreed over the statute’s bar on discrimination
“because of sex”—each side claiming that OPM clearly
supported its interpretation. So who, if anyone, was right? And
how can textualists’ supposedly commonsense OPM inquiry
yield such divergent conclusions?
This Article introduces a new “applied-meaning-experiment”
method to answer those questions and develop the theory of
textualism. The method asks ordinary readers to apply the
relevant statutory language in context, under experimental
conditions that minimize the effect of potential biases or
differences between enactment-era and present-day usage. For
Bostock, the applied-meaning-experiment method reveals that
the majority was probably right: textualists’ “ordinary reader”
at the time of Title VII’s enactment would most likely have
understood it to bar LGBT discrimination. The insights from
*
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the applied-meaning-experiment method, however, extend far
beyond the controversy in Bostock. In other contexts where
textualists disagree over OPM, the method sheds light on how
ordinary readers would have understood statutory terms at the
time they were enacted.
More importantly, the method helps diagnose why
textualists disagree about OPM in a given case. Textualists
might lack probative evidence of OPM, but they might also
implicitly disagree about what they’re looking for. Specifically,
inquiry into actual reader understanding highlights two
choices textualists inevitably make when determining a given
term or phrase’s OPM: (1) the type of question whose answer
would reveal the reader’s relevant “understanding,” and (2) the
types of extratextual information that the reader would treat
as relevant to answering it. To the extent that textualists have
considered either question, they have done so inconsistently,
without realizing what they are doing. By confronting each
choice directly, the applied-meaning-experiment method helps
to build out the theory of textualism in a way that’s needed for
textualism to be capable—at least in theory—of delivering on
its promise of judicial restraint.
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I. INTRODUCTION
When textualist judges interpret a statute, they place great
weight on the “ordinary,” “commonsense,” “everyday” meaning of its
words at the time they were enacted, i.e., their “original public
meaning” (OPM).1 To find OPM, they ask how ordinary readers

1 All judges, not just textualists, consider and defer to ordinary meaning. See VALERIE C.
BRANNON, CONG. RSCH. SERV., R45153, STATUTORY INTERPRETATION: THEORIES, TOOLS, AND
TRENDS 21 (2018); WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE JR., INTERPRETING LAW: A PRIMER ON HOW TO READ
STATUTES AND THE CONSTITUTION 33–55 (Robert C. Clark et al. eds., 2016) [hereinafter
ESKRIDGE, INTERPRETING LAW]. But textualists tend to place greater emphasis on it. See
William N. Eskridge Jr., Textualism, the Unknown Ideal?, 96 MICH. L. REV. 1509, 1511 (1998)
(reviewing ANTONIN SCALIA, A MATTER OF INTERPRETATION: FEDERAL COURTS AND THE LAW
(Amy Gutmann ed., 1997)) (explaining Scalia’s premise that “a statutory text’s apparent plain
meaning must be the alpha and the omega in a judge’s interpretation”); John F. Manning,
What Divides Textualists from Purposivists?, 106 COLUM. L. REV. 70, 74–75 (2006)
[hereinafter Manning, What Divides Textualists from Purposivists?]. Even staunch
textualists recognize exceptions, such as where statutes use technical legal terms of art. See,
e.g., Thomas R. Lee & Stephen C. Mouritsen, Judging Ordinary Meaning, 127 YALE L.J. 788,
792 n.4 (2018). Except as otherwise noted, I set those exceptions aside in this Article.
This Article uses “ordinary meaning” interchangeably with “public meaning” (two terms
also used in recent originalist literature concerning the OPM of constitutional provisions—
i.e., their “ordinary,” “public” meaning at the time they became law). See ESKRIDGE,
INTERPRETING LAW, supra, at 33; Watson v. United States, 552 U.S. 74, 79 (2007); Richard
H. Fallon Jr., The Meaning of Legal “Meaning” and Its Implications for Theories of Legal
Interpretation, 82 U. CHI. L. REV. 1235, 1290 (2015) (“Today . . . mainstream originalists
equate the meaning of constitutional provisions with their ‘original public meaning.’”); Mark
Greenberg, Legislation as Communication? Legal Interpretation and the Study of Linguistic
Communication, in PHILOSOPHICAL FOUNDATIONS OF LANGUAGE IN THE LAW 217, 241 (Andrei
Marmor & Scott Soames eds., 2011). Extant statutory interpretation scholarship treats
“textualism in statutory interpretation as a subspecies of originalism,” effectively assuming
that statutory textualism and constitutional originalism share the same conception of public
meaning and the same view of the relationship between OPM and legal meaning. Hillel Y.
Levin, Justice Gorsuch’s Views on Precedent in the Context of Statutory Interpretation, 70 ALA.
L. REV. 687, 688 n.1 (2019); see also SCALIA, supra, at 38 (“What I look for in the Constitution
is precisely what I look for in a statute: the original meaning of the text . . . .”); Steven G.
Calabresi & Hannah M. Begley, Originalism and Same-Sex Marriage, 70 U. MIA. L. REV. 648,
649 (2016) (“[A]ll modern originalists . . . were and are original public meaning
textualists . . . .”). This Article therefore draws on both modern originalist and textualist
scholarship when addressing OPM and its relation to legal meaning. For my own pushback
against the literature’s seemingly universal assumption that OPM must or should reference
the same type of meaning for purposes of constitutional originalism and statutory textualism,
see infra notes 302–303.
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would have understood the relevant language.2 Textualists
emphasize that this inquiry is factual and empirical, not
normative.3 And they often give it dispositive effect: When ordinary
reader understanding accords with only one side’s interpretation—

2 See Amy Coney Barrett, Congressional Insiders and Outsiders, 84 U. CHI. L. REV. 2193,
2201 (2017); Brett M. Kavanaugh, Fixing Statutory Interpretation, 129 HARV. L. REV. 2118,
2150 n.158 (2016) (reviewing ROBERT A. KATZMANN, JUDGING STATUTES (2014)) (“Under the
‘best reading’ inquiry, the question is only how the words would be read by an ordinary user
of the English language.”); ANTONIN SCALIA & BRYAN A. GARNER, READING LAW: THE
INTERPRETATION OF LEGAL TEXTS 33 (2012) (“The interpretive approach we endorse is that of
the ‘fair reading’: determining the application of a governing text to given facts on the basis
of how a reasonable reader, fully competent in the language, would have understood the text
at the time it was issued.”); William N. Eskridge Jr., The New Textualism, 37 UCLA L. REV.
621, 667 (1990) (“[T]he new textualism . . . focus[es] on the plain meaning a statute would
have for the ordinary, reasonable reader . . . .”). But see Neal Goldfarb, Varieties of Ordinary
Meaning: Comments on Kevin P. Tobia, Testing Ordinary Meaning 2–8 (Nov. 12, 2020)
(unpublished manuscript), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3553016
(distinguishing between ordinary “understanding” and ordinary “usage” and noting judicial
emphasis on both). Textualists often add that their hypothesized ordinary reader is a
“reasonable” one. For more on what this qualification does and doesn’t add, see infra notes
32, 302, and Section IV.B.
3 Kevin P. Tobia, Testing Ordinary Meaning, 134 HARV. L. REV. 726, 731 (2020) (“Ordinary
meaning inquiries are often understood as empirical ones, which aim to discover descriptive
facts about meaning. Theories holding that a legal text must be applied consistently with its
ordinary meaning do not typically characterize their project as a normative inquiry.” (footnote
omitted) (citing Randy E. Barnett, Interpretation and Construction, 34 HARV. J.L. & PUB.
POL’Y 65, 66 (2011) (citing KEITH E. WHITTINGTON, CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION:
TEXTUAL MEANING, ORIGINAL INTENT AND JUDICIAL REVIEW 6 (1999)))); see Lee & Mouritsen,
supra note 1, at 795 (“When we speak of ordinary meaning, we are asking an empirical
question . . . .”); Barrett, supra note 2, at 2204 (“Whether the canons actually capture patterns
of ordinary usage is an empirical question.”); Anya Bernstein, Democratizing Interpretation,
60 WM. & MARY L. REV. 435, 442–51 (2018) (providing examples of cases purporting to rely
on empirical evidence of meaning); Brian G. Slocum, Ordinary Meaning and Empiricism, 40
STATUTE L. REV. 13, 13 (2019) (noting that advocates of corpus linguistics “have stressed that
statutory interpretation is an ‘empirical’ inquiry”); Lawrence B. Solum, Originalist
Methodology, 84 U. CHI. L. REV. 269, 278 (2017) [hereinafter Solum, Originalist Methodology]
(“[I]nterpretation is a factual inquiry that yields communicative content . . . .”); Lawrence B.
Solum, The Fixation Thesis: The Role of Historical Fact in Original Meaning, 91 NOTRE DAME
L. REV. 1, 12 (2015) [hereinafter Solum, The Fixation Thesis] (“Interpretation is an empirical
inquiry.”); Scott Soames, Originalism and Legitimacy, 18 GEO. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 241, 265
(2020) (emphasizing that the goal of interpretation is to discern a fact based on evidence, as
is true in “all empirical inquiries”); James C. Phillips, Daniel M. Ortner & Thomas R. Lee,
Corpus Linguistics & Original Public Meaning: A New Tool To Make Originalism More
Empirical, 126 YALE L.J.F. 21, 21, 24–27 (2016).
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as, for textualists, it usually does4—that side’s interpretation
prevails, full stop.5 As Amy Coney Barrett recently explained,
textualists thus act “as agents of the people,” faithfully interpreting
the words at issue “the way their principal—the people—would
understand them.”6
By marrying this “commonsense,”7 populist orientation8 with the
promise of a “value-neutral,” “objective,” “empirical” “science” of
interpretation,9 textualism has had great success appealing to the

4 See Kavanaugh, supra note 2, at 2129, 2144–45, 2150 (“[A] critical difference between
textualists and purposivists is that, for a variety of reasons, textualists tend to find language
to be clear rather than ambiguous more readily than purposivists do.”); Raymond M.
Kethledge, Ambiguities and Agency Cases: Reflections After (Almost) Ten Years on the Bench,
70 VAND. L. REV. EN BANC 315, 320 (2017) (“In my own opinions as a judge, I have never yet
had occasion to find a statute ambiguous.”); Anita S. Krishnakumar, Textualism and
Statutory Precedents, 104 VA. L. REV. 157, 164–65 (2018) (describing the “‘correct answer’
mindset” that characterizes “textualist Justices, particularly in the post-Scalia era” (footnote
omitted)).
5 This is sometimes referred to as the “plain meaning” rule. William Baude & Ryan D.
Doerfler, The (Not So) Plain Meaning Rule, 84 U. CHI. L. REV. 539, 540–41 (2017). Where the
text’s OPM is not “plain,” “unambiguous,” “clear,” etc., it underdetermines the outcome—i.e.,
it removes from the set of permissible constructions those that are inconsistent with it,
leaving two or more constructions remaining.
6 Barrett, supra note 2, at 2195. Under textualists’ conception of this principal-agent
relationship, textualists interpret statutes in line with “the linguistic expectations of the
regulated,” not the public’s preferences. Id. at 2202 (emphasis added). On potential
divergences between ordinary readers’ understanding and preferences, see infra Section IV.B.
7 Antonin Scalia & John F. Manning, A Dialogue on Statutory and Constitutional
Interpretation, 80 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1610, 1610 (2012).
8 See Anya Bernstein & Glen Staszewski, Judicial Populism, 106 MINN. L. REV.
(forthcoming
2021)
(manuscript
at
1),
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3694132 (discussing populists’ claims
that they speak directly on behalf of the people).
9 E.g., NEIL M. GORSUCH, A REPUBLIC IF YOU CAN KEEP IT 112–13 (2019) (describing
originalists’ “value-neutral methodology” of deciding based on what “the text tells us”); Hively
v. Ivy Tech Cmty. Coll., 853 F.3d 339, 361 (7th Cir. 2017) (en banc) (Sykes, J., dissenting)
(“Statutory interpretation is an objective inquiry that looks for the meaning the statutory
language conveyed to a reasonable person at the time of enactment.”); SCALIA, supra note 1,
at 3 (discussing “the science of construing legal texts”); Phillips et al., supra note 3, at 22; see
also William N. Eskridge Jr., The New Textualism and Normative Canons, 113 COLUM. L.
REV. 531, 533 (2013) (reviewing SCALIA & GARNER, supra note 2) (“[T]he proper textualist
approach, [Scalia and Garner] say, ‘will curb—even reverse—the tendency of judges to imbue
authoritative texts with their own policy preferences’ . . . .” (quoting SCALIA & GARNER, supra
note 2, at xxviii)).
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public and the judiciary alike.10 The risk is that it obscures from the
public—and perhaps from the judiciary itself—the unstated
assumptions and intuitions that are doing much of the work. In
cases of disagreement over OPM, this risk is often realized in the
form of accusations of bad faith.11 With textualism ascendant on the
Supreme Court and throughout the judiciary,12 the stakes of finding
OPM13 have never been higher.14
The Court’s 2020 decision in Bostock v. Clayton County15 provides
a useful illustration. The case concerned whether sexual-orientation
and transgender discrimination are prohibited under Title VII of
the Civil Rights Act of 1964.16 Title VII’s terms prohibit an employer
from discriminating against an employee “because of” the
employee’s “sex” (and where the employee’s “sex” was a “motivating
factor”).17 The Justices all agreed that the “ordinary public

10 See John F. Manning, Justice Scalia and the Idea of Judicial Restraint, 115 MICH. L.
REV. 747, 750, 756 (2017) [hereinafter Manning, Justice Scalia and the Idea of Judicial
Restraint] (reviewing SCALIA, supra note 1); Jonathan T. Molot, Ambivalence About
Formalism, 93 VA. L. REV. 1, 8–12 (2007) (discussing the popularity of textualism among
justices and scholars).
11 See, e.g., infra notes 26–29 and accompanying text.
12 See Scalia & Manning, supra note 7, at 1610 (“In recent years, the Supreme Court has
placed increasing emphasis on the meaning of the enacted text . . . .”); Victoria Nourse,
Textualism 3.0: Statutory Interpretation After Justice Scalia, 70 ALA. L. REV. 667, 669 (2019);
Harvard Law School, The 2015 Scalia Lecture: A Dialogue with Justice Elena Kagan on the
at
8:28
(Nov.
25,
2015),
Reading
of
Statutes,
YOUTUBE,
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=dpEtszFT0Tg&t=9s (“We’re all textualists now.”).
13 By “finding OPM,” I mean both finding the OPM of this or that in a given case, see infra
Part III, and more fundamentally, finding which of the many potential kinds of OPM a given
textualist is invoking, see infra Part IV.
14 Setting aside the stakes for textualist theory, for political discourse, etc., it’s perhaps
worth noting that the stakes of ruling in favor of one side or the other in any given case are
uniquely high for textualists: Not only do textualists’ ordinary meaning determinations
resolve the case at bar and other cases concerning the same language in the same statute,
but judges often also treat them as dispositive with respect to the meaning of other statutes
that use the same or similar language, even where those other statutes concern very different
areas of law. See James A. Macleod, Ordinary Causation: A Study in Experimental Statutory
Interpretation, 94 IND. L.J. 957, 998–99 (2019) (collecting examples from cases interpreting
causal language). Other methods of interpretation rarely generate these sorts of wide-ranging
trans-statutory consequences. Id.
15 140 S. Ct. 1731 (2020).
16 Id. at 1737.
17 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a), (m) (emphasis added); Bostock, 140 S. Ct. at 1739.
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meaning” of the statute’s terms was dispositive.18 To find it, they
consulted popular dictionary definitions,19 examples from everyday
linguistic usage,20 corpus linguistic analysis,21 and even the
imaginary results “[i]f every single living American had been
surveyed in 1964” about the meaning of the statute’s language.22
If the method was familiar, so too was the result: vehement
dissensus.23 Justice Gorsuch, writing for the Court, sided with the
employees’ interpretation of Title VII, holding that the statutory
prohibition
clearly
encompasses
sexual-orientation
and
transgender discrimination.24 “[N]o ambiguity exists,” Justice
Gorsuch emphasized, “about how Title VII’s terms apply to the facts
before us.”25 In dissent, Justice Alito, joined by Justice Thomas,
claimed that “Title VII’s plain text” “indisputably” favors the
employers’ contrary interpretation.26 As to the majority’s
contentions, “[a] more brazen abuse of our authority to interpret
statutes is hard to recall.”27 In a separate dissent, Justice
Kavanaugh wrote that “[o]n occasion, it can be difficult for judges to
assess ordinary meaning. Not here.”28 The majority, by willfully
neglecting the text’s obvious ordinary meaning, had “unilaterally
rewritten American vocabulary and American Law.”29
So, which side was right? And why does textualism’s supposedly
commonsense OPM inquiry—in Bostock and the many other cases

18 See, e.g., Bostock, 140 S. Ct. at 1738 (“This Court normally interprets a statute in accord
with the ordinary public meaning of its terms . . . .”); id. at 1767 (Alito, J., dissenting) (“The
ordinary meaning of discrimination because of ‘sex’ was discrimination because of a person’s
biological sex, not sexual orientation or gender identity.”); id. at 1828 (Kavanaugh, J.,
dissenting) (“Statutory Interpretation 101 instructs courts to follow ordinary meaning . . . .”).
19 E.g., id. at 1740 (majority opinion); id. at 1756, 1765–66, 1772–73 (Alito, J., dissenting).
20 E.g., id. at 1748 (majority opinion); id. at 1828 (Kavanaugh, J., dissenting).
21 Id. at 1769 n.22 (Alito, J., dissenting).
22 Id. at 1755.
23 See, e.g., BRIAN G. SLOCUM, ORDINARY MEANING 292–98 app. D (2015) (listing Supreme
Court cases relying on ordinary meaning but containing dissenting opinions); Krishnakumar,
supra note 4, at 204.
24 Bostock, 140 S. Ct. at 1737 (majority opinion).
25 Id. at 1749.
26 Id. at 1756, 1778 (Alito, J., dissenting).
27 Id. at 1755.
28 Id. at 1828 (Kavanaugh, J., dissenting).
29 Id. at 1836.
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like it—yield such starkly divergent conclusions?30 This Article
introduces a new “applied-meaning-experiment” method to answer
those questions and develop the theory of textualism.31 The keys to
the method are as follows: ask ordinary readers to apply disputed
statutory language in context, under experimental conditions that
minimize potential biases or differences between enactment-era and
present-day usage.32
Using Bostock as a demonstration, this Article reports a set of
experimental survey studies carried out on a nationally
representative sample of ordinary Americans prior to the issuance
of the Supreme Court’s opinion. The studies use the appliedmeaning-experiment method to test the OPM of Title VII’s disputed
language in the contexts of sexual-orientation discrimination,
transgender discrimination, and more “traditional” gender
discrimination claims.33 Various aspects of the experimental design
30 The question has long beset textualism, with its uniquely strong claims of objectivity and
determinacy. See Krishnakumar, supra note 4, at 204–10 (describing textualists’ “‘correct
answer’ mindset”); SCALIA & GARNER, supra note 2, at xxvii–xxix, 6 (asserting that “most
interpretive questions have a right answer” and that the proper textualist approach “will
provide greater certainty in the law, and hence greater predictability”); Eskridge, supra note
9, at 532–34; Manning, Justice Scalia and the Idea of Judicial Restraint, supra note 10, at
750 (describing textualism’s “anti-discretion” principle). As Judge Kethledge recently
explained,
[W]e have definitions for every word in the language, and rules of grammar,
and, perhaps most important, our own ordinary usage of the language . . . .
[T]hese materials limit the judge rather than liberate him. And when used
without bias, they allow the judge to identify not merely the plausible
interpretations of the text, but the best one. For, in my experience at least,
if one works hard enough, all the other interpretations are eventually
revealed as imposters.
Kethledge, supra note 4, at 319–20.
31 In this respect, this Article builds on a prior study concerning the ordinary meaning of
causal language, albeit language that raised a different set of interpretive issues. See
generally Macleod, supra note 14 (testing the influence of causal necessity and causal
sufficiency on lay ascription of causation).
32 By “biases,” I mean the treatment of irrelevant considerations as relevant, or, in other
words, the consideration of anything that textualists’ “reasonable” reader would not consider.
Uncontroversial examples include the reader’s own factually mistaken beliefs, as well as the
reader’s own preferences for a given legal outcome. See, e.g., Lawrence B. Solum,
Triangulating Public Meaning: Corpus Linguistics, Immersion, and the Constitutional
Record, 2017 BYU L. REV. 1621, 1637–38 [hereinafter Solum, Triangulating Public Meaning];
SCALIA & GARNER, supra note 2, at 31. Section IV.B discusses at greater length what sorts of
considerations textualists appear to deem irrelevant and potentially “biasing.”
33 For details, see infra Section III.B.2.
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helped to root out any post-enactment drift in language or morality
that might otherwise lead modern-day interpreters to favor the
employees’ interpretation for anachronistic or biased reasons.34 At
its core, though, the studies’ design was simple. Participants read
short vignettes describing an instance of, e.g., workplace sexualorientation discrimination, after which they were asked, among
other things, whether the employer fired the employee “because of”
the employee’s “sex.”35
The results favored the Bostock majority’s interpretation. Most
respondents found the statutory language applicable to each type of
employment discrimination tested. Most respondents, for example,
claimed that an employer who fires an employee because of the
employee’s sexual orientation thereby fires the employee “because
of [the employee’s] sex,” and that the employee’s sex was clearly a
“motivating factor” in the employer’s decision, even where the
employer was equally hostile toward gay men and gay women.36
And the results were even more decisively in favor of finding
transgender discrimination encompassed by the statute’s
prohibition—despite respondents’ (and the public’s) lower support
for legal prohibitions of transgender discrimination.37 These and
other findings detailed in Part III have been conceptually replicated
in a follow-up study run by separate researchers.38 In the end,
despite the dissenting Justices’ emphatic rhetorical embrace of
ordinary reader understanding, they (along with other prominent
textualist critics of the Bostock majority’s opinion) appear to have
been surprisingly out of step with it.39

See infra Section III.B.4.
See infra Section III.B.2; see also infra note 196 (comparing this applied-meaningexperiment method to alternative survey-based methods of interpreting legal texts).
36 See infra Section III.B.2.a.
37 See infra Section IV.B.2.b. Additionally, notwithstanding Title VII’s well-established
coverage of Price Waterhouse-style gender-stereotype discrimination, respondents deemed
that type of discrimination no more clearly prohibited by Title VII’s ordinary language than
sexual-orientation discrimination and indeed less clearly prohibited than transgender
discrimination. See infra Section III.B.2.c.
38 See Kevin Tobia & John Mikhail, Two Types of Empirical Textualism, 86 BROOK. L. REV.
(forthcoming
2021)
(manuscript
at
15–27),
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3729629.
39 See infra Part II (discussing criticism of the Bostock majority); Sections III.B.3–4
(summarizing the empirical data and responding to potential objections).
34
35
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But while these results have important implications for Bostock,
the method has implications that extend far beyond Bostock. First,
it can be used elsewhere to answer the central question textualists
ask in a given case: which side’s interpretation accords with the
statutory language’s OPM? The method has an especially important
role to play where, as in Bostock, alternative sources of evidence like
dictionaries and legal corpus linguistics prove incapable of
addressing, let alone resolving, the OPM issue that the parties
actually dispute.40 But even in cases where those other methods
speak to the relevant issue, the applied-meaning-experiment
method may provide supplementary—and often far more
probative—evidence of OPM.41
Second, and more importantly, the method helps reveal why
textualists frequently disagree about the OPM of a given statutory
word or phrase.42 Part of the reason, the studies suggest, is that
textualists frequently lack probative evidence of a given word or
phrase’s OPM.43 But the studies also suggest a complementary
explanation for textualist disagreement, which stems not from
textualists’ incomplete evidence but instead from their incomplete
ontology (i.e., their underspecified account of what they’re looking
for evidence of in the first place).
More specifically, the applied-meaning-experiment method
brings to the surface two important ambiguities in textualists’
notion of ordinary reader “understanding,” and hence textualists’
conception of OPM. The ambiguities’ existence helps explain
40 Recall that all Justices and parties stipulated to the same definition of “sex.” See infra
note 66. Roughly speaking, then, the disputed question concerned the use of the phrase “Y
because of X,” as applied where “Y because of Z” is undisputed, and “Z” is necessarily partially
defined by “X.” (Here, “Y” is “firing an employee,” “Z” is “sexual orientation” or “gender
identity,” and “X” is “sex.”) See Tobia & Mikhail, supra note 38, at 15–27 (testing the same
construction for additional values of Z and X—e.g., “because of race,” in the context of
miscegenation). As explained further at infra notes 120–125 and accompanying text, neither
dictionary definitions nor legal corpus linguistics provides probative evidence as to this
central question.
41 See infra Section III.B.1.
42 See, e.g., SLOCUM, supra note 23, at 292–98 app. D.
43 Judges, lacking the sort of evidence that could confirm or disconfirm their initial
hunches, exhibit the same “false consensus bias” that the lay respondents in this Article’s
surveys exhibit. That is, they mistakenly think that their own understanding tracks most
other people’s, even when it, in fact, does not. See infra Section III.B.3. For explanations of
differences in initial hunches, see Macleod, supra note 14, at 1007, and Cass R. Sunstein,
Textualism and the Duck-Rabbit Illusion, 11 CALIF. L. REV. 463, 463–78 (2020).

Published by Digital Commons @ University of Georgia School of Law, 2022

11

Georgia Law Review, Vol. 56, Iss. 1 [2022], Art. 2

12

GEORGIA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 56:1

textualist disagreement as a practical matter, and the ambiguities’
perpetuation threatens textualist claims of in-principle textual
determinacy as a matter of theory. Stated in terms of textualists’
ordinary reader inquiry, the ambiguities concern: (1) the type of
question whose answer would reveal the ordinary reader’s relevant
“understanding,” and (2) the types of extratextual information that
the reader would treat as relevant to answering it. To date,
textualists have resolved each of these ambiguities inconsistently,
effectively undermining textualism’s emphasis on fair notice,
reliance interests, and—most central to textualists’ self-image—
judicial restraint.44
Consider the first ambiguity regarding question-type. There are
two basic approaches textualists take. Each produces a different
reading of statutory language. I’ll label the approaches “Applied”
and “Abstract,” respectively. Under an Applied approach,
textualists’ hypothesized ordinary reader answers a yes-or-no
question concerning the application of a word or phrase to a set of
facts (e.g., upon learning of an instance of sexual-orientation
discrimination, she answers the question, “Did the employer fire the
employee ‘because of’ the employee’s ‘sex’?”; or, to use Hart’s famous
example of a statute prohibiting vehicles in a park,45 upon looking
44 See infra notes 268–277 and accompanying text; see also Manning, Justice Scalia and
the Idea of Judicial Restraint, supra note 10, at 749–50.
Judges and scholars have previously noted a third ambiguity, which constitutes a distinct
but less fundamental source of textualist disagreement: judges may implicitly disagree about
how clear the text must be in order for it to fully determine the outcome of the case without
recourse to other sources of evidence. On this topic, see, for example, Kavanaugh, supra note
2, at 2136; Richard M. Re, Clarity Doctrines, 86 U. CHI. L. REV. 1497, 1499 (2019); and Ward
Farnsworth, Dustin F. Guzior & Anup Malani, Ambiguity About Ambiguity: An Empirical
Inquiry into Legal Interpretation 2 J. LEGAL ANALYSIS 257, 257–60 (2010). This “how-clearis-‘clear’” choice is addressed below in Section III.B.4.d. But despite the attention it has
received, it is less consequential than the two sets of choices on which this Article focuses.
First, the how-clear-is-clear question comes into play only after judges resolve these other
choices; judges must interpret the statute before they can address whether it satisfies a given
clarity threshold. Second, the how-clear-is-clear question apparently arises in a relatively
small set of cases. Most cases of textualist disagreement, at least in the Supreme Court, are
like Bostock: each side claims that its own interpretation is dictated by the clear terms of the
text. Inter-textualist disagreements rarely pit one side that claims the support of clear text
against another that claims ambiguity. Cf. Kavanaugh, supra note 2, at 2129 (emphasizing
textualists’ tendency to find text clear). This is especially so in the current age of waning
Chevron deference, at least in the Supreme Court. Id. at 2151.
45 See H.L.A. Hart, Positivism and the Separation of Law and Morals, 71 HARV. L. REV.
593, 607 (1958).
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at a baby stroller, she answers the question, “Is that a ‘vehicle’?”).
An Applied approach thus reveals whether the full extent of the
statutory language encompasses the facts at issue. By contrast, an
Abstract approach provides the reader only the facts or the
statutory language—not both—and asks an open-ended question to
see whether the reader spontaneously generates the missing half in
her initial response. In other words, an Abstract approach asks the
reader to answer a question about either (a) how best to describe the
facts at issue (e.g., upon learning of an instance of sexualorientation discrimination, answering the question, “Why did the
employer fire the employee?”; upon seeing a baby stroller,
answering the question, “What is that thing?”), or (b) how best to
illustrate the statutory language (e.g., “What’s an example of an
employee being fired ‘because of’ his or her ‘sex’?” or, “What’s an
example of a ‘vehicle’?”). By considering only the reader’s initial
response, an Abstract approach generates a much narrower
construction of the statutory language.46 Textualists cannot avoid
choosing between these approaches to ordinary reader
“understanding,” and hence, to OPM.47 Their choice—ad hoc, rarely
made explicit, and never given explicit justification—is in many
cases outcome-determinative.48
Now consider the second ambiguity, regarding extratextual
considerations. Whichever question-type the textualist chooses, she
must still make this second set of choices concerning the types of
information that her hypothesized reasonable ordinary reader
would deem relevant to answering the question. Oftentimes
textualists’ ordinary reader considers only the surrounding text,
An Abstract approach is compatible with considering, say, the reader’s first five
responses, as opposed to only her first response. See infra note 257.
47 See infra Part IV.
48 See infra notes 268, 293 (providing examples, in addition to Bostock, from Supreme Court
caselaw). To be clear, in speaking of “choices” that “determine outcomes,” I don’t mean that
judges first consciously select among imagined question-types or the corresponding
conceptions of OPM and then endorse whatever interpretation results. As a matter of
psychology, it may well be that OPM claims are mere window dressing. Perhaps judges
consciously decide based on their ideological preferences, based on which interpretation just
“feels” sensible, or based on some other considerations entirely. My claim instead concerns
the choice that an interpreter must in effect make whenever attempting to adhere to
textualist theory. The same goes for the second ambiguity about to be discussed in the body
of the text, concerning the choice of which extratextual information to treat as relevant; the
“choice” is often outcome-determinative in theory, even if it never crosses judges’ minds
during their actual decision-making processes.
46
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along with facts about ordinary linguistic usage.49 But at other
times, textualists imply that the reader treats various types of
additional extratextual considerations as relevant. These may
include the public’s preferences for this or that legal outcome,50 the
public’s implicit (non-textualist) theories of interpretation,51 and the
public’s expectations regarding this or that application of a statute
(perhaps based on partisan media reports, rather than on the
precise language of the statute).52 Textualists cannot avoid choosing
which types of extratextual information their hypothesized reader
treats as relevant. But so far—as with the choice of question-type—
textualists have made this choice in an ad hoc, unprincipled, and
inconsistent manner,53 undermining textualism’s core values and
even threatening the very coherence of textualism as a theory of
interpretation.54
49 E.g., SCALIA & GARNER, supra note 2, at 33 (explaining the utility of context in
interpretation); Barrett, supra note 2, at 2203 (listing sources for interpretation informed by
“ordinary English speakers”).
50 See infra notes 292–297 and accompanying text.
51 Empirical evidence demonstrates that ordinary people are at least somewhat
purposivist. See, e.g., Shlomo Klapper, Soren Schmidt & Tor Tarantola, Ordinary Meaning
from Ordinary People, U.C. IRVINE L. REV. (forthcoming 2021) (manuscript at 7),
https://www.readcube.com/articles/10.2139%2Fssrn.3593917; see also Noel Struchiner, Ivar
R. Hannikainen & Guilherme da F.C.F. de Almeida, An Experimental Guide to Vehicles in
the Park, 15 JUDGMENT & DECISION MAKING 312, 327 (2020). Ordinary people might also
treat various publicly available sources of information (perhaps even legislative history or
legislative history as filtered through popular media) as relevant to determining statutory
meaning. In short, ordinary people don’t systematically ignore information relevant to
(individual or group) speakers’ intent, as textualists contend judges ought to do when the text
is clear on its face. Cf. Baude & Doerfler, supra note 5, at 546–49.
52 See infra notes 307–308 and accompanying text.
53 Infra notes 293–303 and accompanying text. In a recent Comment on Bostock, Tara Leigh
Grove compares the majority’s “formalistic textualism,” which focuses on “semantic context,”
“downplaying policy concerns,” and “practical (even monumental) consequences,” with the
dissenters’ more “flexible textualism,” which permits consideration of “policy and social
context as well as practical consequences.” Tara Leigh Grove, Which Textualism?, 134 HARV.
L. REV. 265, 267 (2020). Grove’s distinction seems to track the basic distinction I’m drawing
here, at least with respect to certain categories of extratextual considerations. See infra
Section IV.B.
54 See supra notes 6–10 and accompanying text; infra notes 305–306 and accompanying
text (discussing the implications of treating as relevant ordinary readers’ preferences,
implicit theories of interpretation, and popular-media-based or legislative-history-based
expectations); see also infra notes 307–308 and accompanying text (discussing the possibility,
given the public’s low opinion of Congress, that textualism—by treating public expectations
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This Article’s applied-meaning-experiment method helps
uncover these ambiguities and demonstrate the outcomedeterminative effect of resolving them one way as opposed to
another in individual cases. Textualists must now confront these
ambiguities and commit to a single, principled conception of OPM—
one that resolves each choice in a consistent manner, thereby
rendering textualism at least capable of justifying its frequent
claims of textual determinacy in disputed cases.55 Toward that end,
this Article argues that to preserve textualism’s theoretical
coherence and honor its normative commitments, textualists would
probably need to embrace an approach to ordinary reader
“understanding”—and, hence, a conception of OPM—that tracks (1)
an Applied question-type, and (2) only a minimal set of extratextual
considerations.56 This Article also suggests that despite textualists’
inconsistencies to date, on balance, this approach reflects the
conception of OPM that textualist judges and scholars have tended
implicitly to favor.57
Before proceeding, here are two notes about this Article’s scope.
First, much of this Article’s analysis of textualism applies equally
to OPM-based constitutional originalism, the leading version of
originalism today. (For example, with respect to their conception of
OPM, constitutional originalists must confront the same hidden
ambiguities described above.58) But this Article leaves those
applications and comparisons mostly implicit and focuses almost
exclusively on textualist statutory interpretation. Second, this
Article does not argue that textualism is or is not normatively
desirable, all things considered.59 To some, using experimental
survey studies to interpret statutes may seem like a reductio ad

as relevant and public preferences as irrelevant—could lead to the systematic adoption of the
public’s most-feared outcomes).
55 At least, in the many cases where different outcomes would result from different
resolutions of the ambiguities concerning question-type or the extratextual considerations.
56 See infra notes 278–290, 304–308 and accompanying text.
57 See infra notes 278–290, 304–308 and accompanying text.
58 See supra note 1 (noting the literature’s seemingly unanimous assumption that statutory
textualist and constitutional originalist theories must employ the same conception of OPM);
infra note 303 (arguing, against the conventional wisdom, that there may be principled,
warranted divergences between statutory textualists’ and constitutional originalists’
operative conceptions of OPM).
59 Doing so would require, among other things, an evaluation of the alternatives to
textualism, about which this Article says almost nothing.

Published by Digital Commons @ University of Georgia School of Law, 2022

15

Georgia Law Review, Vol. 56, Iss. 1 [2022], Art. 2

16

GEORGIA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 56:1

absurdum argument against textualism—to others, a roadmap for
a more rigorous and accurate textualism. Neither reaction is
inconsistent with the main aim of this Article: to clarify and test
textualists’ claims, thereby rendering textualism—both as a general
theory and as applied in concrete cases—more amenable to scrutiny
and evaluation. Underlying that aim is the conviction that
textualists too often talk past each other and past their critics.
Significant progress would be made if textualists were compelled to
answer the question at the root of this Article’s methodology: What
sort of experiment would (even if just in principle) reveal the OPM
of a given term or phrase, and what would the results of that
experiment need to be in order to demonstrate that the text’s OPM
is clear?60 The stakes are too high for interpreters’ intuitions about
“the people’s understanding” to remain vague in theory and
untested in practice.
This Article proceeds as follows. Part II provides an overview of
the OPM-based arguments in Bostock. Section III.A examines the
types of evidence on which courts, including the Bostock Court, base
their OPM claims (specifically: intuition, thought experiments,
dictionaries, and corpus linguistics). Section III.B argues that the
applied-meaning-experiment method can provide more probative
evidence of OPM than these other sources. It then gives a
demonstration, reporting four studies testing OPM in the context of
Bostock and related cases. Finally, it provides a short summary of
the studies’ design, results, and implications and responds to
potential objections. Part IV leverages the experimental framework
to highlight two largely overlooked sources of textualist
disagreement, both of which relate to ambiguities in textualists’
conceptions of OPM. By confronting each ambiguity directly, the
applied-meaning-experiment method helps to build out the theory
of textualism in a way that’s needed for textualism to be both

60 This goes for critics of textualism as well, whenever they purport to lay bare a textualist
decisionmaker’s hypocrisy by demonstrating that the decisionmaker reached the wrong
outcome as a matter of textualist interpretation (perhaps due to the alleged hypocritical
textualist’s ideological motivations). Such accusations imply that the critic has overcome the
evidentiary and ontological hurdles discussed in this Article. See, e.g., infra notes 252–253
and accompanying text.
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coherent and capable, at least in theory, of increasing legal
determinacy and decreasing judicial disagreement.61

II. “TEXTUALISM’S MOMENT OF TRUTH”
In a staunchly textualist 6–3 decision, the Bostock Court held
that Title VII prohibits both sexual-orientation and transgender
discrimination.62 Billed by William Eskridge as “[t]extualism’s
moment of truth,”63 the decision cut across ideological lines in what
some consider a demonstration of textualism’s ability to generate

On the possibility of incoherence, see supra note 51 and accompanying text and infra
notes 302–303 and accompanying text. On the question of normative attractiveness, see, for
example, infra notes 293–303 and accompanying text.
62 Bostock v. Clayton Cnty., 140 S. Ct. 1731 (2020). The Bostock decision concerns a set of
three consolidated cases: Zarda v. Altitude Express, Inc., 883 F.3d 100, 107–08 (2d Cir. 2018)
(en banc) (describing the gay plaintiff-employee’s allegation that he was fired because of his
sexual orientation); EEOC v. R.G. & G.R. Harris Funeral Homes, Inc., 884 F.3d 560, 567–69
(6th Cir. 2018) (recounting the employee’s allegation that she was fired because of her being
transgender); Bostock v. Clayton Cnty. Bd. of Comm’rs, 723 F. App’x 964, 964–65 (11th Cir.
2018) (per curiam) (relying upon prior precedent holding that sexual-orientation
discrimination is not prohibited by Title VII to affirm dismissal of a gay male employee’s Title
VII claim), rev’d, 140 S. Ct. 1731 (2020).
Title VII, passed as part of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, provides in relevant part: “It shall
be an unlawful employment practice for an employer . . . to fail or refuse to hire or to
discharge any individual, or otherwise to discriminate against any individual with respect to
his compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment, because of such individual’s
race, color, religion, sex, or national origin . . . .” 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a) (emphasis added). In
a 1991 amendment, Congress specified that employers would be liable so long as the
employee’s sex was “a motivating factor . . . even though other factors also motivated” the
employer’s decision. Civil Rights Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-166, § 107(a), 105 Stat. 1071,
1075 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(m)); see also H.R. REP. NO. 102-40, pt. 1, at
48 (1991) (explaining the Committee’s intention to establish “that an employer may be held
liable for any discrimination that is actually shown to play a role in a contested employment
decision”). In another provision, Congress limited the relief available where the unlawful
consideration was merely a “motivating factor” and not a but-for cause. § 107(b), 105 Stat. at
1075–76 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g)(2)(B)). The Bostock Court, like the
circuit courts prior to it, treated 1964, not 1991, as the relevant date for all of its OPM
analysis. See Bostock, 140 S. Ct. at 1739–40.
63 William N. Eskridge Jr., Symposium: Textualism’s Moment of Truth, SCOTUSBLOG
(Sept. 4, 2019, 2:30 PM), https://www.scotusblog.com/2019/09/symposium-textualismsmoment-of-truth/#more-288953.
61
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principled consensus in the face of ideological differences.64 But the
interplay between the majority and dissenting opinions also
demonstrated textualism’s surprising tendency to engender
emphatic disagreement among its adherents when applied in
particular cases.65
Before turning to these areas of disagreement in Bostock, it’s
worth noting three broad points on which all of the Justices (along
with all of the circuit court judges in the related en banc
proceedings) explicitly agreed. First, all agreed that the “ordinary
public meaning” of the relevant statutory words and phrases has
not changed since their enactment in 1964 (or 1991 for the statute’s
“motivating factor” language).66 In other words, all agreed that

64 See, e.g., Grove, supra note 53, at 304–05. Others are more skeptical. E.g., Jeannie Suk
Gersen, Could the Supreme Court’s Landmark L.G.B.T.-Rights Decision Help Lead to the
YORKER
(June
27,
2020),
Dismantling
of
Affirmative
Action?,
NEW
https://www.newyorker.com/news/our-columnists/could-the-supreme-courts-landmark-lgbtrights-decision-help-lead-to-the-dismantling-of-affirmative-action; cf. Sheryl Gay Stolberg,
Gorsuch Not Easy to Pigeonhole on Gay Rights, Friends Say, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 11, 2017),
https://www.nytimes.com/2017/02/11/us/politics/gorsuch-gay-rights.html.
65 See supra notes 25–29 and accompanying text.
66 See Bostock, 140 S. Ct. at 1739 (“[W]e proceed on the assumption that ‘sex’ signified what
the employers suggest, referring only to biological distinctions between male and female.”);
id. at 1740, 1750 (explaining that the employers provided no indication “that the meaning of
any of Title VII’s language has changed since 1964” (emphasis added)); id. at 1825, 1828, 1833
(Kavanaugh, J., dissenting) (“To a fluent speaker of the English language—then and now—
. . . discrimination ‘because of sex’ is not reasonably understood to include discrimination
based on sexual orientation . . . .”) (alteration in original) (emphasis added) (quoting Hively
v. Ivy Tech Cmty. Coll., 853 F.3d 339, 363 (7th Cir. 2017) (en banc) (Sykes, J., dissenting)));
id. at 1766 (Alito, J., dissenting) (“[D]iscrimination because of ‘sex’ was understood during
the era when Title VII was enacted to refer to men and women. (The same is true of current
definitions . . . . )”); Transcript of Oral Argument at 7, 22, 32, 60–61, Bostock, 140 S. Ct. 1731
(No. 17-1618) and Zarda v. Altitude Express, Inc., 140 S. Ct. 1731 (2020) (No. 17-1623),
https://www.supremecourt.gov/oral_arguments/argument_transcripts/2019/171618_7k47.pdf; Transcript of Oral Argument, at 4–5, 24, 28–30, 46, R.G. & G.R. Harris
Funeral Homes, Inc. v. EEOC, 140 S. Ct. 1731 (2020) (No. 18-107),
https://www.supremecourt.gov/oral_arguments/argument_transcripts/2019/18-107_6j37.pdf;
accord Zarda v. Altitude Express, Inc., 883 F.3d 100, 145 (2d Cir. 2018) (en banc) (Lynch, J.,
dissenting); id. at 134 (Jacobs, J., concurring); Wittmer v. Phillips 66 Co., 915 F.3d 328, 334–
35 (5th Cir. 2019) (Ho, J., concurring). Judge Posner is the sole arguable exception. See Hively
v. Ivy Tech Cmty. Coll., 853 F.3d 339, 355 (7th Cir. 2017) (en banc) (Posner, J., concurring)
(contending that the modern ordinary understanding of the term “sex” is “broader” than it
was in 1964).
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Bostock is a case in which the “temporal principle” that “[t]he
ordinary meaning that counts is the ordinary public meaning at the
time of enactment . . . matters little”67 because no “shifts in linguistic
usage” have changed that meaning since the words were enacted.68
Second, the Justices all agreed that where a statute’s OPM is clear,
that meaning fully determines the outcome of the case.69 The rule of
law, the Justices emphasized in typical textualist fashion, requires
as much.70 Third, all agreed that “no ambiguity exists about how
Title VII’s terms apply to the facts before us”;71 the OPM of the
statute’s terms, in other words, is clear and therefore fully
determines the outcome of the interpretive dispute.72
Of course, the Justices vehemently disagreed about what the
OPM of Title VII’s relevant language actually is. Starting with the
dissenting opinions, which most consistently and emphatically
claimed the mantle of OPM, Justice Alito’s dissent (joined by Justice
Thomas) repeatedly asserts that the result of the ordinary reader
test, and hence the OPM of the statute, “could not be clearer”: “In
1964, ordinary Americans reading the text of Title VII would not
have dreamed that discrimination because of sex meant
discrimination because of sexual orientation, much less gender
identity.”73 Justice Kavanaugh’s dissent, similarly focused on
ordinary reader understanding, easily arrives at the same
conclusion: “To a fluent speaker of the English language—then and
now—. . . discrimination ‘because of sex’ is not reasonably
understood to include discrimination based on sexual
orientation . . . . There is no ambiguity or vagueness here.”74
For an argument that the ordinary meaning of “sex” has changed since 1964, and that the
Court should not have adopted the parties’ stipulated enactment-era definition, see William
N. Eskridge Jr., Brian G. Slocum & Stefan Th. Gries, The Meaning of Sex: Dynamic Words,
Novel Applications, and Original Public Meaning, 119 MICH. L. REV. 1503 (2021).
67 Bostock, 140 S. Ct. at 1825 (Kavanaugh, J., dissenting) (emphasis added).
68 Id. at 1750 (majority opinion); see also supra note 66.
69 Bostock, 140 S. Ct. at 1749 (“[W]hen the meaning of the statute’s terms is plain, our job
is at an end.”); id. at 1825 (Kavanaugh, J., dissenting); id. at 1774 (Alito, J., dissenting).
70 See id. at 1749 (majority opinion); id. at 1825 (Kavanaugh, J., dissenting).
71 Id. at 1749 (majority opinion); id. at 1828 (Kavanaugh, J., dissenting).
72 Id. at 1750 (majority opinion).
73 Id. at 1767 (Alito, J., dissenting). The majority’s contrary conclusion is therefore
“squarely contrary to the statutory text.” Id. at 1763.
74 Id. at 1833 (Kavanaugh, J., dissenting) (alteration in original) (quoting Hively v. Ivy
Tech Cmty. Coll., 853 F.3d 339, 363 (7th Cir. 2017) (en banc) (Sykes, J., dissenting)).
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Justice Gorsuch’s majority opinion, on the other hand, claims
that “the ordinary public meaning of the statute’s language” plainly
favors the opposite conclusion.75 But despite that conclusion and the
opinion’s repeated invocation of the text’s OPM, the opinion’s “key
move,” according to Josh Blackman and Randy Barnett (among
others), is to “retreat” from OPM when analyzing the statute’s
crucial causal language.76 Justice Gorsuch, write Blackman and
Barnett, abandoned the ordinary meaning of the term “because of”
“in favor of a specialized, technical legal meaning — what lawyers
refer to as a term of art.”77 Specifically, Justice Gorsuch’s opinion
emphasizes that “in the language of law . . . Title VII’s ‘because of’
test incorporates the . . . standard of but-for causation.”78 To his
critics, this emphasis on technical legal meaning, rather than
ordinary meaning, amounts to “Halfway Textualism,”79
“Counterfeit Textualism,”80 or what Justice Alito might label
“Pirate Ship Textualism”: “The Court’s opinion is like a pirate ship.
It sails under a textualist flag,”81 purporting to humbly defer to the
people’s ordinary understanding while in fact “unilaterally
rewrit[ing] American vocabulary and American law.”82 Justice
Kavanaugh, content to leave pirates out of this, simply quotes
Justice Gorsuch’s own words from another case, implying that they
speak for themselves: “Contrary to the [Court’s] approach today,
this Court has repeatedly emphasized that . . . courts heed how ‘most

Justice Kavanaugh’s dissent, like the other Bostock opinions, focuses on sexual-orientation
discrimination but explains that the analysis “would apply in much the same way to
discrimination on the basis of gender identity.” Id. at 1823 n.1.
75 Id. at 1741 (majority opinion).
76 Josh Blackman & Randy Barnett, Justice Gorsuch’s Halfway Textualism Surprises and
Disappoints in the Title VII Cases, NAT’L REV. (June 26, 2020, 6:30 AM),
https://www.nationalreview.com/2020/06/justice-gorsuch-title-vii-cases-half-way-textualismsurprises-disappoints/; see also, e.g., Nelson Lund, Unleashed and Unbound: Living
Textualism in Bostock v. Clayton County, 21 FEDERALIST SOC’Y REV. 158, 160 (2020) (calling
this move “crucial[]”).
77 Blackman & Barnett, supra note 76.
78 Id. (emphasis added) (quoting Bostock, 140 S. Ct. at 1739).
79 Id.
80 See Robert P. George, Counterfeit Textualism, NAT’L REV. (Nov. 19, 2019, 5:06 PM),
https://www.nationalreview.com/2019/11/counterfeit-textualism/ (criticizing reliance on butfor causation as a basis for interpreting Title VII in the same way that Gorsuch used it to
adopt the employees’ interpretation in Bostock).
81 Bostock, 140 S. Ct. at 1755 (Alito, J., dissenting).
82 Id. at 1836 (Kavanaugh, J., dissenting).
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people’ ‘would have understood’ the text of a statute when
enacted.”83
Granted, the very cases on which Justice Gorsuch relies claim
that the ordinary, everyday meaning of “because of” just is what the
law refers to as “but-for causation.”84 And Justice Gorsuch purports
to see no contradiction, steadfastly maintaining that only his
interpretation accords with the text’s OPM.85 Still, critics like
Blackman and Barnett are correct that Justice Gorsuch, in
emphasizing the but-for standard’s legal pedigree, rather than its
roots in ordinary language, makes at least a rhetorical “retreat”86
from ordinary meaning—signaling doubt as to whether the ordinary
meaning of “because of” does in fact support the majority’s
position.87 Armed with the but-for causation standard, Justice
Gorsuch quickly concludes that “it is impossible to discriminate
against a person for being homosexual or transgender without
discriminating against that individual based on sex.”88 After all,
Justice Gorsuch claims, in any case of sexual-orientation or
transgender discrimination, the employee would not have been fired
if, keeping all else constant, the employee had been the opposite
biological sex.89 Whether ultimately grounded in ordinary meaning
83 Id. at 1828 (Kavanaugh, J., dissenting) (emphasis added) (quoting New Prime Inc. v.
Oliveira, 139 S. Ct. 532, 539 (2019)).
84 Id. at 1739 (majority opinion) (first citing Univ. of Tex. Sw. Med. Ctr. v. Nassar, 570 U.S.
338, 350 (2013); then citing Gross v. FBL Fin. Servs., Inc., 557 U.S. 167, 176 (2009); and then
citing Burrage v. United States, 571 U.S. 204, 211–12 (2014)); see also Macleod, supra note
14, at 966–70 (examining causation analyses in these cases, among others).
85 Indeed, he argues that the dissenters’ interpretation “would deny the people the right to
continue relying on the original meaning of the law.” Bostock, 140 S. Ct. at 1738; see also id.
at 1778 (Alito, J., dissenting) (repeating the majority’s claim that the public has a right “to
rely on the law as written, without fearing that courts might disregard its plain terms”
(quoting id. at 1749 (majority opinion))).
86 Blackman & Barnett, supra note 76.
87 See, e.g., Bostock, 140 S. Ct. at 1743 (majority opinion) (“At bottom, these cases involve
no more than the straightforward application of legal terms with plain and settled meanings.”
(emphasis added)); id. at 1745 (discussing “what kind of cause the law is looking for in a Title
VII case” (emphasis added)).
88 Bostock, 140 S. Ct. at 1741.
89 Id. By way of illustration, in the sexual-orientation context: if Employee, a male attracted
to males, had instead been a female attracted to males, Employee would not have been fired.
Id. Likewise, in the gender-identity context: if Employee, born biologically male but with a
female gender identity, were born biologically female, Employee would not have been fired.
Id.
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or technical legal meaning—each of which the majority seems to
emphasize at different points—the majority’s construal of the
statute’s causal language makes all the difference.90

III. FINDING ORIGINAL PUBLIC MEANING
As happens with surprising frequency in textualist decisionmaking, the Bostock Court ended up at a highly stratified standstill. But how does this happen when ordinary meaning is supposed
to be an objective, empirical, commonsense fact about everyday
linguistic usage? Part of the problem, this Part explains, lies in the
deficient forms of evidence that judges and scholars have relied on
to find ordinary public meaning. Continuing with Bostock as an
illustrative example, Section III.A shows why the traditional types
of evidence on which courts rely (intuition, thought experiments,
dictionaries, and corpus linguistics methods) so often fail to move
interpreters any closer to consensus than they would be without the
evidence—and justifiably so. Section III.B.1 argues that a new
“applied-meaning-experiment” method can provide much more
To be sure, the “but-for” standard can be deceptively difficult in its application. “Keeping
all other things constant” is literally impossible, so long as relational properties count as
“things” (by “relational properties,” I mean, e.g., the property of having a same-sex partner,
or of having a gender identity that doesn’t “match” one’s biological sex). In other words, in
each case, when changing Employee’s biological sex for purposes of the counterfactual
analysis, one is forced to change at least one other thing. In the sexual-orientation example,
one must also change either Employee’s sexual orientation or Employee’s partner’s sex;
likewise, in the gender-identity example, one cannot simply change Employee’s sex, but must
also change either Employee’s transgender status or Employee’s gender. Anuj C. Desai, Text
is Not Enough, 93 U. COLO. L. REV. (forthcoming 2021) (manuscript at 14–18),
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3861914. But neither dissenting
opinion in Bostock argues that the majority picked the wrong additional thing to change for
purposes of the but-for analysis (e.g., neither dissent claimed that the majority erred in
changing Employee’s sexual orientation, rather than Employee’s partner’s sex, for purposes
of applying the but-for test). For an introduction to the cognitive science and experimental
philosophy literature concerning which counterfactuals strike ordinary people as more
intuitively apt than others for purposes of ascribing causation, see generally Thomas F. Icard,
Jonathan F. Kominsky & Joshua Knobe, Normality and Actual Causal Strength, 161
COGNITION 80 (2017).
90 Blackman & Barnett, supra note 76 (arguing that Justice Gorsuch’s interpretation of the
words “because of” “dictated the outcome of Gorsuch’s entire textualist analysis”); see also
Bostock, 140 S. Ct. at 1745 (describing the role of but-for cause in sex discrimination as
outcome-determinative in this case); Lund, supra note 76, at 160–63 (criticizing Gorsuch’s
causation analysis).
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probative evidence of OPM. To demonstrate, Section III.B.2 reports
a set of experimental survey studies that use the method to answer
the disputed question of OPM in Bostock. The resulting data,
summarized in Section III.B.3, undermine the dissenters’ claims
and demonstrate why the Bostock majority’s much-criticized
“retreat” from ordinary meaning was unnecessary.
A. TRADITIONAL EVIDENCE

One common way for judges to find statutory terms’ OPM is
through introspection, using their own commonsense intuitions
about how ordinary people understand language.91 Of course, judges
cannot simply repeat their brute intuition until their audience
shares it.92 Whether as a pure rhetorical device or as part of a
genuine search for evidence, judges often explicitly “test” their
intuitions by considering hypothetical or real-world examples
(sometimes called “thought experiments” or “intuition pumps”93),
noting whether it seems intuitive to use the term at issue in these
analogous contexts.94
The Bostock opinions are chock-full of such thought
experiments.95 For example, Justice Gorsuch proposes that we
“[i]magine that it’s a nice day outside and your house is too warm,
so you decide to open the window. Both the cool temperature outside
and the heat inside are but-for causes of your choice to open the
window.”96 Yet despite their being more than one but-for cause of
the window being open, “no one would deny that the window is open
‘because of’ the outside temperature. Our cases are much the
91 See LAWRENCE M. SOLAN, THE LANGUAGE OF JUDGES 26 (William M. O’Barr & John M.
Conley eds., 1993).
92 That said, judges sometimes appear to try. See Macleod, supra note 14, at 969–71
(discussing examples); Bostock, 140 S. Ct. at 1758 (Alito, J., dissenting) (“[T]he Court asserts
again and again that discrimination because of sexual orientation or gender identity
inherently or necessarily entails discrimination because of sex[,] . . . [b]ut repetition of an
assertion does not make it so . . . .”).
93 E.g., DANIEL C. DENNETT, INTUITION PUMPS AND OTHER TOOLS FOR THINKING 5 (2013).
94 See, e.g., Kethledge, supra note 4, at 321–22 (explaining that testing ordinary meaning
intuitions via thought experiments is an “often colorful and fun part of the job of statutory
interpretation”).
95 See, e.g., Bostock 140 S. Ct. at 1741–42, 1748 (majority opinion); id. at 1760 (Alito, J.,
dissenting).
96 Id. at 1748 (majority opinion).

Published by Digital Commons @ University of Georgia School of Law, 2022

23

Georgia Law Review, Vol. 56, Iss. 1 [2022], Art. 2

24

GEORGIA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 56:1

same.”97 And for Justice Kavanaugh, it is revealing to imagine how
the Bostock and Zarda plaintiffs would respond if their friends were
to ask them why they were fired.98 In this hypothetical conversation,
they would probably “not tell their friends that they were fired
because of their sex”—an indication that, “[a]s commonly
understood, sexual orientation discrimination is . . . not a form of[]
sex discrimination.”99 These and the opinions’ many other examples
are representative of the sorts of thought experiments that
permeate textualist judicial decisions.100
But one judge’s intuitions, even when “tested” via thought
experiments, may be unrepresentative of the general public’s
intuitions. After all, any sample size of one is bound to result in
some errors. And judges are keenly aware of the legal and policy
implications of one or another interpretation.101 They may therefore
be prone to motivated cognition, systematically favoring those
intuitions and thought experiments that support their preferred
outcome.102 For these and other reasons, judges have sought more
objective, external evidence of OPM.103
With increasing frequency, judges have turned to popular
dictionaries.104 The Bostock opinions, for example, quote dozens of
dictionary definitions, all concerning perfectly common words like
“individual,” “discriminate,” and “sex.”105 But while dictionaries can
prove useful in some cases,106 they often fail to speak to the context

Id. (emphasis added).
Id. at 1828 (Kavanaugh, J., dissenting).
99 Id. at 1828 (emphasis added); see also id. at 1745 (majority opinion) (considering the
same hypothetical but arguing that it fails to vindicate the employers’ interpretation).
100 See Macleod, supra note 14, at 985–86 (providing examples).
101 See DENNETT, supra note 93, at 13–14 (discussing the pressures a judge faces due to
their awareness of the “consequences of a judicial decision”).
102 See Macleod, supra note 14, at 985.
103 See id. at 986–91.
104 See Jeffrey L. Kirchmeier & Samuel A. Thumma, Scaling the Lexicon Fortress: The
United States Supreme Court’s Use of Dictionaries in the Twenty-First Century, 94 MARQ. L.
REV. 77, 79–80 (2010).
105 E.g., Bostock, 140 S. Ct. at 1740 (majority opinion) (using dictionaries to define
“discriminate” and “individual”); id. at 1756 (Alito, J., dissenting) (citing various dictionary
definitions of “sex”).
106 For example, they are useful in cases interpreting technical legal terms of art defined
in contemporaneous legal dictionaries. See, e.g., FAA v. Cooper, 566 U.S. 284, 291–92 (2012)
(identifying “actual damages” as a legal term of art and defining it by reference to a legal
dictionary).
97
98
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in which a word is used in a given statute or as applied to a given
fact pattern.107 As a result, dictionaries may fail to address, let alone
resolve, the relatively nuanced dispute that sent judges to the
dictionary in the first place.108 The Bostock majority, for example,
appears to consider the dissenters’ dictionary definitions to be
beside the point, perhaps because the definitions fail to address the
competing understandings of the words “because of” that lie at the
center of the interpretive dispute.109 Nor would popular definitions
of “because of,” “motivating factor,” or related terms have proven
helpful.110
In light of these and other problems with judicial use of
dictionaries,111 some scholars and judges have turned to “corpus
linguistics” to ascertain the ordinary public meaning of statutory
language.112 Corpus linguistics analyzes large databases of
“naturally occurring” language (books, newspaper articles, etc.)—
the sort of raw usage data on which lexicographers rely to craft

See Craig Hoffman, Parse the Sentence First: Curbing the Urge to Resort to the
Dictionary When Interpreting Legal Texts, 6 N.Y.U. J. LEGIS. & PUB. POL’Y 401, 406−07
(2003); A. Raymond Randolph, Dictionaries, Plain Meaning, and Context in Statutory
Interpretation, 17 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 71, 73−74 (1994).
108 See Macleod, supra note 14, at 987 n.171 (discussing examples).
109 See Bostock, 140 S. Ct. at 1750 (majority opinion) (characterizing the dissenting
opinions—including the eight pages of dictionary definitions of “sex” that comprise Appendix
A to Justice Alito’s dissent—as failing to “offer an alternative account about what [the
statute’s] terms mean either when viewed individually or in the aggregate”).
110 See Macleod, supra note 14, at 987 n.171 (illustrating that popular dictionary definitions
fail to illuminate whether the phrase “because of” entails but-for causation, let alone how to
apply the but-for test in practice); cf. supra note 89 (noting complexities concerning the
application of the but-for test).
111 Judges armed with multiple dictionaries and multiple definitions of a given word within
each dictionary can choose whichever definition supports their preferred outcome. See
Lawrence M. Solan & Tammy Gales, Corpus Linguistics as a Tool in Legal Interpretation,
2017 BYU L. Rev. 1311, 1334; SLOCUM, supra note 23, at 215. The dissenting Justices in
Bostock, for example, accuse the majority of “scaveng[ing] the world of English usage,” finding
its preferred acontextual definition of each term, and re-combining those definitions to reach
an “exotic meaning” of the text. 140 S. Ct. at 1772 (Alito, J., dissenting) (quoting Chisom v.
Roemer, 501 U.S. 380, 410 (1991) (Scalia, J., dissenting)); see also id. at 1827 (Kavanaugh, J.,
dissenting) (“‘Legislation cannot sensibly be interpreted by stringing together dictionary
synonyms of each word . . . .’” (quoting Zarda v. Altitude Express, Inc., 883 F.3d 100, 144 n.7
(2d Cir. 2018) (Lynch, J., dissenting))).
112 See, e.g., Thomas R. Lee & James C. Phillips, Data-Driven Originalism, 167 U. PA. L.
REV. 261, 289–96 (2019); Wilson v. Safelite Grp., Inc., 930 F.3d 429, 440 (6th Cir. 2019)
(Thapar, J., concurring); Solum, Triangulating Public Meaning, supra note 32, at 1669–71.
107
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dictionary definitions.113 By searching the raw usage data, one can
observe how words and phrases were used in these sources. And by
counting how often words or phrases appear to have been used the
way one side advocates compared to the way the other side
advocates, legal corpus linguistics can often reveal which usage is
more frequent and, in that sense, more “ordinary.”114 In Bostock,
Justice Alito relies on a corpus linguistics analysis conducted by
James C. Phillips.115 (Justice Thomas, who joined Alito’s dissent,
has also relied on corpus linguistic analyses in his own recent
published opinions.116) According to Justice Alito, Phillips’s study
confirms that, “as used in 1964, ‘discrimination because of sex’
would have been understood to mean [only] discrimination against
a woman or a man based on ‘unfair beliefs or attitudes’ about
members of that particular sex.”117
Judges and scholars (myself included) have offered various
criticisms of legal corpus linguistics,118 many of which question
whether its frequency-of-usage comparisons are as probative of
OPM as its proponents claim.119 But rather than rehearse those

See Solan & Gales, supra note 111, at 1337.
See id. at 1342–54; Brian G. Slocum & Stefan Th. Gries, Judging Corpus Linguistics,
94 S. CAL. L. REV. POSTSCRIPT 13, 30–31 (2020) (“Corpus-linguistic data provide nothing but
frequencies . . . .”) (citing STEFAN TH. GRIES, QUANTITATIVE CORPUS LINGUISTICS WITH R 141
(2d ed. 2017))). In discussing “legal corpus linguistics,” I refer specifically to how corpus
linguistics has been used in judicial opinions and legal scholarship to date. Corpus linguistics
is an entire subfield in linguistics with many methods and projects unrelated to legal
interpretation. See generally GRIES, supra.
115 Bostock, 140 S. Ct. at 1769 n.22 (Alito, J., dissenting) (discussing James C. Phillips, The
Overlooked Evidence in the Title VII Cases: The Linguistic (and Therefore Textualist)
Principle
of
Compositionality
(May
11,
2020)
(unpublished
manuscript).
https://www.supremecourt.gov/opinions/URLs_Cited/OT2019/17-1618/17-1618-3.pdf).
116 E.g., Carpenter v. United States, 138 S. Ct. 2206, 2238–39 (2018) (Thomas, J.,
dissenting) (applying corpus linguistics to determine the original meaning of “search”); Lucia
v. SEC, 138 S. Ct. 2044, 2056 (2018) (Thomas, J., concurring) (citing Jennifer L. Mascott, Who
Are “Officers of the United States”?, 70 STAN. L. REV. 443, 564 (2018), which used corpus
linguistics to derive a definition of “officer” in Article II).
117 Bostock, 140 S. Ct. at 1769 n.22 (emphasis added) (quoting Phillips, supra note 115, at
7).
118 See, e.g., Thomas R. Lee & Stephen C. Mouritsen, The Corpus and the Critics, 88 U. CHI.
L. REV. 275, 311–41 (2021) (addressing criticism of corpus linguistic analysis in legal
interpretation); Macleod, supra note 14, at 989–91; Lawrence M. Solan, Corpus Linguistics
as a Method of Legal Interpretation: Some Progress, Some Questions, 33 INT’L J. FOR
SEMIOTICS L. 283, 290-97 (2020).
119 See Macleod, supra note 14, at 990 nn.184, 189 (citing examples).
113
114
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criticisms, let’s assume that this sort of relative frequency data is
highly probative of OPM. Even then, Phillips’s study and Justice
Alito’s reliance on it highlight a further underappreciated problem
with legal corpus linguistics: in some cases, legal corpus linguistic
analysis may turn out to be largely irrelevant because the method
can’t differentiate between the two competing interpretations at
issue.
Bostock presents one such case. Specifically, legal corpus
linguistics can’t determine whether a given instance of the phrase
“because of X” appearing in the corpus resembles the Bostock
plaintiffs’ interpretation or instead the Bostock defendants’
interpretation.120 Without that ability to differentiate, there’s no
way to count which one appears more frequently, and therefore no
way to “confirm” (or disconfirm) Justice Alito’s conclusion. Consider
an example. Suppose that a book in the corpus mentions that a man
was discriminated against “because of his race.” To determine
whether this instance of “because of . . . [trait]” resembles the
Bostock plaintiffs’ or instead the defendants’ reading of Title VII, we
need to know the following: Was race the sole object of the
discriminating actor’s prejudice, or was, say, miscegenation also an
object of it? If the former, then this instance of “because of race”
resembles the Bostock defendants’ understanding of “because of
sex”; if the latter, then it resembles the plaintiffs’ understanding.
But to determine whether the direct object of the discriminating
agent’s prejudice is better construed as “race” or as “miscegenation”
requires literary interpretation, or, in any event, not the sort of
analysis that corpus linguistics provides.121 (Phillips, for his part,
sidesteps the entire issue by setting aside all instances of the phrase
“discriminate against . . . because of [some trait].”122 Instead, he
considers only instances of “discriminate against” that lack causal
120 A different question—one with respect to which corpus linguistics would be much more
informative—would have concerned the meaning of “sex,” and whether it has changed over
time. See Eskridge et al., supra note 66, at 1515. But I put that analysis aside because every
judge to consider the matter has stipulated to its definition (as I do in the experimental survey
studies reported below). See supra note 66.
121 See, e.g., Lee & Mouritsen, supra note 1, at 844–845 (analyzing whether an “airplane”
is a “vehicle” by counting how frequently the terms “airplane” and “vehicle” appear together,
i.e., by doing a “collocation” analysis similar to Phillips’s, rather than undertaking the
relatively simple interpretive investigation into whether those instances of collocation
involved assertions that an airplane is a vehicle).
122 Phillips, supra note 115, at 3–5 (emphasis added).
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language immediately following them, e.g., “discriminate against
women,” and “discriminate against Jews,”123 and concludes that
they support the defendants’ interpretation.124) In short, even
assuming that relative frequency data would be probative of OPM,
corpus linguistics is in some cases—Bostock included—unable to
generate the relevant data in the first place.125
B. BETTER EVIDENCE

1. The Merits of the Applied-Meaning-Experiment Method. The
prior Section surveyed the various types of evidence on which
textualists have relied to find OPM. But as Justice Alito emphasizes
in Bostock, “what matters in the end is the answer to the question
that the evidence is gathered to resolve: How would the terms of a
statute have been understood by ordinary people at the time of
enactment?”126 A better way to answer that question is by actually
asking ordinary people to read the relevant statutory language and
apply it in context. To find ordinary public meaning, we can use
survey experiments to ask ordinary members of the public questions
that reveal their understanding of the terms at issue. Of course, we
can’t travel back in time to ask people in 1964 or 1991. But
according to every Supreme Court Justice and every circuit court
judge to have considered the matter, the ordinary meaning of the
relevant text has not changed post-enactment.127 And in any event,
even if they’re mistaken, various aspects of the experiments’ design
can root out and minimize the influence of post-enactment linguistic
drift.128
Id. at 5.
Id. at 7.
125 For another example, see Macleod, supra note 14, at 989–90 (noting corpus linguistics’
inability to discern whether assertions that X was a “cause” exclusively involved but-for
causes, or instead also included mere contributing, non-but-for factors).
126 Bostock v. Clayton Cnty., 140 S. Ct. 1731, 1766 (2020) (Alito, J., dissenting) (emphasis
added); see also Kavanaugh, supra note 2, at 2150 n.158 (arguing that judges should interpret
statutes in accordance with the “‘best reading’ inquiry,” which asks “only how the words
would be read by an ordinary user of the English language”).
127 See supra note 66 (quoting the judges, Justices, and parties involved in recent Title VII
LGBT discrimination litigation).
128 To be clear, it’s possible that, contrary to some judges’ and commentators’ assertions,
any undetected post-enactment linguistic drift would skew the modern survey’s results, if at
123
124
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Experimental survey studies can overcome the problems that
plague other types of OPM evidence. Whereas intuition and thought
experiments are based on a sample size of one, survey experiments
actually sample the general population, letting idiosyncratic
intuitions and biases cancel each other out.129 Moreover, the
influence of widely shared biases—for example, those stemming
from readers’ moral and legal preferences or factual
misunderstandings—can be minimized through various aspects of
the experimental design. Ordinary readers can then produce results
that reflect textualists’ “reasonable” reader understanding.130 And
while dictionary definitions and corpus linguistic analyses may
prove unable to speak to the interpretive issue raised in a given
case, survey experiments can be designed to test it directly.131
Before providing a demonstration, it’s worth noting two
additional strengths of survey-based experimental interpretation
that sometimes masquerade as weaknesses. Richard Fallon gives
voice to each when explaining why constitutional originalists rarely

all, in the defendants’ favor, not the plaintiffs’—making the survey’s results, which favor the
plaintiffs, more remarkable. See Eskridge et al., supra note 66, at 1550–58 (arguing that “sex”
had a broader meaning in 1964 than it does today). But see Transcript of Oral Argument at
21–22,
30,
Bostock,
140
S.
Ct.
1731
(No.
17-1618)
(Alito,
J.),
https://www.supremecourt.gov/oral_arguments/argument_transcripts/2019/171618_7k47.pd
f (implying that modern definitions of “sex” are more expansive than enactment-era
definitions). As for drift in moral views, it would likely skew results in the opposite direction
(i.e., in the plaintiffs’ favor) if the experiment were to reflect it. But the experimental design
sought to prevent readers’ moral views or legal preferences from skewing the results
significantly, if at all, and appeared to succeed in this regard. See infra Section III.B.4; see
also infra Section IV.B (discussing the treatment of moral views and legal preferences as
“biases” for purposes of textualist interpretation).
129 As for less idiosyncratic biases, surveys can omit information irrelevant to the
interpretive issue at hand. And if there are systematic differences in interpretation stemming
from interpreters’ demographic characteristics or ideological preferences, experiments allow
that information to come to light. Cf. Christina Mulligan, Diverse Originalism, 21 U. PA. J.
CONST. L. 379, 412–13 (2018) (discussing potential differences in understandings of the
Constitution among different Founding-era demographic groups); Dan M. Kahan, David A.
Hoffman & Donald Braman, Whose Eyes Are You Going to Believe? Scott v. Harris and the
Perils of Cognitive Illiberalism, 122 HARV. L. REV. 837, 841 (2009) (discussing differences in
interpretation of video evidence among different demographic groups).
130 Cf. infra Section IV.B.
131 Of course, experimental survey studies are not without genuine drawbacks.
Significantly, linguistic drift may render such studies nonprobative with respect to certain
terms and phrases, especially where they are used in statutes enacted long ago. See Macleod,
supra note 14, at 992–93.
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speak of OPM in terms of “the answers that most people or a
plurality of people would have given to an imagined pollster.”132
First, “[i]t is notorious that the answers that pollsters get frequently
depend on how they formulate their questions.”133 Therefore, there
is “uncertainty about how exactly to specify the question that a
historically nonexistent pollster ought to have asked.”134 This
uncertainty as to the relevant question to ask ordinary readers may
initially seem like a drawback for surveys. But (to foreshadow
Section IV.A) it is a feature of survey-based interpretation—not a
bug—that in cases of disagreement it forces interpreters to address
this uncertainty,135 rather than simply to incant an underspecified
notion of ordinary reader “understanding” and ignore important
underlying sources of disagreement over OPM.136 Moreover, the
method allows one to measure the effect of different question types.
To the extent that subtle variations generate large shifts in reader
response, those shifts may often reflect an inconvenient but
important truth for those claiming that the relevant text possesses
a single clear, indisputable OPM.
Second, as Fallon notes, originalists emphasize that a law’s OPM
can diverge from ordinary readers’ expectations concerning the
law’s application.137 Specifically, this happens where those
expectations are premised on bias, factual error, or failure to
consider relevant information.138 If surveys merely poll people for
their expected applications without rooting out biases and factual
errors that might render those expectations mistaken, those results
would indeed be problematic. But survey experiments need not ask
respondents to give an opinion about the application of law to fact

132 Richard H. Fallon Jr., The Chimerical Concept of Original Public Meaning 35
(unpublished manuscript), https://www.law.nyu.edu/sites/default/files/Fallon%20.pdf.
133 Id.
134 Id.
135 A similar information-forcing benefit arises with respect to the “how-clear-is-clear”
question, though that question is less frequently a source of inter-textualist disagreement.
See supra note 44; infra Section III.B.4.d.
136 See infra Section IV.A.
137 See Fallon, supra note 132, at 35.
138 As far as I can tell, this is an exhaustive list of the circumstances under which
enactment-era ordinary readers’ understanding can fail to track OPM. Originalists cite
factual error most often. See, e.g., Lawrence B. Solum, Surprising Originalism: The Regula
Lecture, 9 CONLAWNOW 235, 253–55 (2018); Steven G. Calabresi & Andrea Matthews,
Originalism and Loving v. Virginia, 2012 BYU L. REV. 1393, 1398–1400.
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(hence this Article’s use of the “applied-meaning-experiment” label,
rather than, say, “legal-application-experiment”).139 And in any
event (to foreshadow Section IV.B), it’s a virtue of the experimental
approach that in cases of disagreement it forces interpreters to be
clear about what information or attitudes are irrelevant or biasing,
rather than to simply gesture at their imagined reader’s
“reasonableness” and again avoid important underlying sources of
disagreement over OPM.140 Moreover, this method allows one to
measure and adjust for the effect of improper considerations in the
event that the experimental design cannot eliminate them.141
2. A Demonstration. This Section reports four experimental
survey studies that test how ordinary people understand and apply
Title VII’s operative language in the contexts of sexual-orientation
discrimination, transgender discrimination, and more “traditional”
gender-based discrimination.142 (A general overview and summary
of the results begins on page 45 below.)
All four surveys were administered online to a combined total of
883 respondents recruited by Lucid Fulcrum Exchange, a company
that supplies nationally representative samples that mirror the
demographic makeup of the United States.143 They were
See infra note 196.
Cf. Richard H. Fallon Jr., The Statutory Interpretation Muddle, 114 NW. U. L. REV. 269,
293–94 (2019).
141 See, e.g., infra Section III.B.2.d.
142 By “traditional gender-based discrimination,” I mean discrimination in a setting
modeled on the facts of Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228, 235 (1989) (plurality
opinion).
143 See LUCID, https://luc.id/ (last visited Nov. 5, 2021); Alexander Coppock & Oliver A.
McClellan, Validating the Demographic, Political, Psychological, and Experimental Results
Obtained from a New Source of Online Survey Respondents, RSCH. & POL., Jan.–Mar. 2019,
at 1.
Combining all four vignettes, the demographics were as follows: 49% male, 51% female;
ages 18–84 years, with a mean age of 45.5 years and a standard deviation of 16.8 years. For
race, 74% of the sample self-identified as White, 12% as Black, 8% as Asian, Native Hawaiian,
or Pacific Islander, and 6% as Other. On a separate question, 10% of the sample reported that
they are Latino or Hispanic. For education, 2% of the sample had not finished high school,
26% had high school diplomas, 3% had post high school vocational training, 23% had some
college experience, 6% had a two-year degree, 29% had a four-year college degree, 9% had
master’s or professional degrees, and 1% had doctorates or other professional degrees. For
political party, 46% indicated that they are anywhere from “Strong Democrat” to “leaning
Democrat”; 39% indicated that they are anywhere from “Strong Republican” to “leaning
Republican”; and 15% indicated that they lean toward neither political party. Approximately
139
140
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administered prior to the release of the Supreme Court’s decision in
Bostock, minimizing the possibility that knowledge of the case’s
outcome could influence the results.144

a. Study 1: Sexual-Orientation Discrimination
(Bostock/Zarda)
Materials. At the beginning of the survey, each respondent read
the following: “A dictionary defines a person’s ‘sex’ as ‘the property
of being biologically male or female.’ Please assume that definition
of the word ‘sex’ applies throughout the survey.” This definition was
technically unnecessary insofar as judges (including Supreme Court
Justices) have consistently claimed that this definition represents
the OPM of the word “sex” today, as well as in 1964.145 Still, I
included the definition for two reasons: first, because a few judges
and lawyers have merely stipulated for purposes of argument that
this definition remains accurate without taking a position; and
second, because others have occasionally asserted that the term
“sex” is more capacious in modern usage than in 1964, stacking
modern intuitions in favor of the Bostock employees.146
After receiving the stipulated definition of “sex,” each respondent
read the following vignette:147
38% reported an annual household income of less than $30,000, and 21% reported over
$75,000. For region, all respondents were in the United States, with 20% in the Northeast,
20% Midwest, 38% South, and 22% West. For a breakdown of demographics in each of the
four studies individually, see https://osf.io/ce4sk/.
The first three surveys were administered June 25–26, 2019. The fourth survey was
administered January 16–19, 2020. Respondents were not permitted to participate in more
than one of the surveys.
144 That said, the results of the first and second studies—concerning sexual-orientation and
transgender discrimination, respectively—have been conceptually replicated after the
Bostock decision came out. See Tobia & Mikhail, supra note 38, at 12.
145 See supra note 66 and accompanying text; Eskridge et al., supra note 66, at 1506–07
(“[T]he Bostock Court was unanimous in maintaining that the meanings of all the relevant
terms . . . were the same in 2021 as in 1964.”).
146 E.g., Transcript of Oral Argument at 30–31, Bostock v. Clayton Cnty., 140 S. Ct. 1731
(2020) (No. 17-1618) (Alito, J.).
147 The structure and wording of the vignettes were parallel in all three surveys so that the
relevant differences—i.e., sexual-orientation discrimination in Study 1, transgender
discrimination in Study 2, and traditional gender stereotype discrimination in Study 3—could
be compared in the analysis. Note that the vignette was designed to isolate the relevant legal
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Gene worked for a website design company
that his boss, Bill, owns. Gene is a gay male, but
he isn’t very open about his sexual orientation,
and he doesn’t act the way many people associate
with being gay. So most people who know Gene
(including Bill) simply assume Gene is straight.
Bill believes that it is morally wrong to be
attracted to the same sex. Bill also believes that,
if he were to knowingly employ a male who is
attracted to other males, or a female who is
attracted to other females, that would make Bill
complicit in their immorality.
So when Bill recently learned that Gene is gay,
Bill fired Gene, despite Gene’s excellent work
performance.
Respondents then answered the following five questions, which
aimed to measure respondents’ interpretation of the statutory
language (questions (A) and (B)) along with circuit courts’ pattern
jury instructions (questions (C), (D), and (E)).148
• (A) Was Gene’s sex a motivating factor in Bill’s
decision to fire Gene?149
• (B) Was Gene fired because of Gene’s sex?150
issue. A survey that stuck closer to the facts in each case—especially as alleged in pleadings
construed in favor of non-moving plaintiffs on appeal—would almost certainly garner more
pro-plaintiff responses. But it would do so by including aspects of the case that, while relevant
to some arguments made by the litigants, are irrelevant to the textualist plain language
claims on which this Article focuses.
148 The first “motivating factor” question (i.e., the question employing the 1991 statutory
causation language) always appeared first; the remaining four questions appeared in random
order.
149 See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(m) (“[A]n unlawful employment practice is established
when . . . sex . . . was a motivating factor for any employment practice, even though other
factors also motivated the practice.”).
150 See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a) (“It shall be an unlawful employment practice for an
employer . . . to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual, or otherwise to
discriminate against any individual with respect to his compensation, terms, conditions, or
privileges of employment, because of such individual’s . . . sex . . . .” (emphasis added)).
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• (C) Did Gene’s sex influence or make a difference in
Bill’s decision to fire Gene, even if Gene’s sex wasn’t
the only reason Bill fired him?151
• (D) Did Gene’s sex contribute to Bill’s decision to fire
Gene?152
• (E) Was Gene’s sex a factor that played some part in
Bill’s decision to fire Gene?153
Each question had four response options: [1] Clearly YES; [2]
Probably YES; [3] Probably NO; [4] Clearly NO.
After answering question (A), and before answering the
remaining four questions, respondents were asked the following
question: “100 other people are taking this survey. Out of the 100,
how many do you predict will agree with you and answer either
‘Clearly [YES/NO]’ or ‘Probably [YES/NO]’ (as opposed to ‘Clearly
[NO/YES]’ or ‘Probably [NO/YES]’).”154 This question aimed to
measure whether respondents exhibited false consensus bias in
their interpretation of the operative statutory language (i.e.,
whether people overestimated the extent to which others would
agree with their interpretation).155
Immediately after reading the vignette and answering the
questions above, participants were asked, “Which of the following
dictionary definitions of a person’s ‘sex’ comes closer to the definition
that you used when answering the previous questions?: (a) ‘The
property of being biologically male or female’; (b) ‘The property of
being related in any way to sexual activity’.” Respondents who
See Eleventh Circuit Civil Pattern Jury Instructions, in 4 LEONARD B. SAND ET AL.,
MODERN FEDERAL JURY INSTRUCTIONS: CIVIL § 4.5 (2021) (requiring the plaintiff to show that
her membership in a protected class “influenced the [employer’s] decision,” and emphasizing
that the plaintiff “does not have to prove that” the plaintiff’s membership in a protected class
“was the only reason that” the employer made the decision).
152 See COMM. ON PATTERN CIV. JURY INSTRUCTIONS OF THE SEVENTH CIR., FEDERAL CIVIL
JURY INSTRUCTIONS OF THE SEVENTH CIRCUIT § 3.01, at 59–60 (2017),
http://www.ca7.uscourts.gov/pattern-jury-instructions/7th_cir_civil_instructions.pdf
(requiring the plaintiff to show that her membership in a protected class “contributed to
Defendant’s decision” to satisfy the “motivating factor” element).
153 See SAND ET AL., supra note 151, ¶ 88.03 (“A ‘motivating factor’ is a factor that played
some part in defendant’s employment practice decision.”).
154 Anybody who failed to type a number between 0 and 100 was excluded from the study.
155 See Lawrence Solan, Terri Rosenblatt & Daniel Osherson, False Consensus Bias in
Contract Interpretation, 108 COLUM. L. REV. 1268, 1268–69 (2008).
151
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selected the latter definition were excluded from the study for
having failed to follow the instructions to apply the narrow
biological definition of “sex” stipulated at the outset of the survey.156
Next, respondents answered three questions that aimed to reveal
a benchmark consensus rate for questions with clearly correct
answers.157 Specifically, two questions sought to determine the high
benchmark for “yes” responses by asking, “Was Gene fired because
of his sexual orientation (in other words, was he fired because he is
gay)?” and “Was the fact that Gene is gay a motivating factor in Bill’s
decision to fire Gene?” Because the vignette quite directly spoke to
this question, “no” responses would seem to be either the product of
inattention or of drawing inferences unsupported by the vignette’s
text. As a low benchmark for “yes” responses, on the other hand,
respondents were asked, “Was Gene fired because of his age?”
Because the vignette said nothing about Gene’s age, “yes” responses
would seem likewise unwarranted.
Respondents were then asked to indicate their level of agreement
or disagreement with the following three statements related to
moral and policy attitudes:
•
•
•

“It is morally wrong to be gay.”
“It is wrong to fire somebody because they are gay.”
“It should generally be illegal to fire somebody
because they are gay.”

The four possible responses were: [1] Strongly agree; [2] Agree; [3]
Disagree; [4] Strongly disagree.
Next, respondents were asked to write a brief explanation for
why they think Gene’s “biological sex” did or did not constitute a
156 Near the end of the survey (directly prior to the moral and policy attitude questions),
respondents were asked one more comprehension question: “Gene is biologically: (a) male; (b)
female.” Respondents who answered “female” were excluded from the study for having failed
to pay attention to or comprehend the vignette.
157 Surveys virtually never generate 100% agreement no matter how clear they are; it’s
therefore common practice to compare the rate of agreement observed with respect to
questions of interest not to a 100% benchmark but rather to the rate of agreement observed
in the same sample with respect to questions that have very clear right answers. See, e.g.,
Omri Ben-Shahar & Lior Jacob Strahilevitz, Interpreting Contracts via Surveys and
Experiments, 92 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1753, 1779 (2017); Daniel J. Hemel & Lisa Larrimore
Ouellette, Public Perceptions of Government Speech, 2017 SUP. CT. REV. 33, 65; Macleod,
supra note 14, at 1007 n.238.
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“motivating factor” in Bill’s decision.158 Finally, respondents
answered various demographic questions (gender, political party,
etc.).
Results.159 223 respondents completed Study 1.
Statutory language. As shown in Figures 1 and 2 below, most
respondents found the statutory language applicable to sexualorientation discrimination as described in the vignette. Specifically,
77% of respondents deemed the “motivating factor” language
applicable,160 while 60% deemed the “because of” language
applicable.161
Jury instructions. All three “motivating factor” jury instructions
elicited responses that fell between the “motivating factor” question
(on the high end) and the “because of” question (on the low end).
Differences among the three were negligible.162
158 Six respondents clearly indicated that they had only answered “yes” or “no” to that
earlier question by mistake and that they disagreed with their initial answer. These
respondents were excluded from the study. The same criterion led to the exclusion of two
respondents in Study 2, two respondents in Study 3, and one respondent in Study 4.
159 Throughout this Section, “significant” refers to statistical significance, which denotes
the rejection of the null hypothesis—the possibility of no differences between the various
groups—at a probability level indicated by the p-value reported. Thus, p is defined as the
probability of finding a difference or relationship between two groups as large as that
observed if there were, in fact, no difference or relationship between them. Following
convention, this Article labels p values at or below 0.05 as establishing statistical significance.
With only two exceptions, however, see infra notes 166 and 181, the findings in this Article
are associated with p values that are all at or below 0.005. Cf. John P.A. Ioannidis, The
Proposal to Lower P Value Thresholds to .005, 319 JAMA 1429, 1429 (2018).
In total, five statistical tests were used: Welch’s ANOVA was used to compare responses
between more than two different vignettes; a Wilcoxon signed-rank test was used to compare
two responses in the same vignette; an independent samples t-test was used to compare
responses between two different vignettes; a chi-squared test was used alongside the
independent samples t-test in order to analyze responses using a binary (yes-or-no); and
linear regression was used to determine whether responses to moral/political questions
predicted responses to statutory language questions.
160 Mean = 1.75. Reported means are the average of all four responses, not just the “Yes”
responses. As previously indicated, “Clearly yes” was coded as “1”; “Probably yes” was coded
as “2”; “Probably no” was coded as “3”; and “Clearly no” was coded as “4.” Therefore, questions
that elicited greater “yes” responses will have lower means, and vice versa.
Figure 1, infra, shows percentages of respondents selecting each of the four responses.
161 Mean = 2.17. Figure 2, infra, shows percentages of respondents selecting each of the
four responses.
162 Specifically, the Seventh Circuit’s “generate or make a difference” instruction, question
(D) from the bulleted list above, garnered the greatest “yes” response (70%) (mean = 1.98),
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Benchmark questions. Responses to the three high- and lowbenchmark questions elicited rational responses that tracked the
appropriate answer to each.163
False consensus bias. The minority of respondents that gave a
“no” answer to the statutory “motivating factor” question drastically
overestimated the extent to which others would agree with their
interpretation (even predicting that their own interpretation was
the majority interpretation), thereby exhibiting false consensus
bias.164
Demographic association with statutory language. Neither of the
two demographic variables tested—respondent gender and political
party—showed any significant association with responses to either
of the two statutory questions.
Moral/policy view association with statutory language.
Responses to the three moral/policy statements showed no
significant association with responses to the “because of” question,
but two did show significant association with responses to the
“motivating factor” question. Specifically, increased agreement with
the statement, “It should generally be illegal to fire somebody for
being gay,” was associated with a significant increase in “yes”

with the Sand et al.’s “a factor that played some part” instruction, question (E), only slightly
lower (69%) (mean = 1.95), and the Eleventh Circuit’s “contribute to” instruction, question
(C), as lowest of the three (67%) (mean = 2.02).
Because the same basic pattern appeared in all four studies, the jury instruction results
for Studies 2, 3, and 4 are not reported below. For the same reason, the “benchmark question,”
“false consensus bias,” and “demographic association” results are not reported for Studies 2,
3, and 4. For those results, see https://osf.io/ce4sk/.
163 When asked whether the employee’s “sexual orientation” was a “motivating factor,” 96%
answered “yes” (mean = 1.2). Likewise, when asked whether the employer fired the employee
“because of” the employee’s “sexual orientation,” 98% answered “yes” (mean = 1.16). Finally,
answers to the low-benchmark question were indeed far lower: when asked whether the
employer fired the employee because of the employee’s “age,” 15% answered “yes” (mean =
3.5). This relatively high 15% benchmark might be attributable to some combination of
inattentiveness and propensity-style reasoning, such as a possible conclusion that a biasprone employer is likely to engage in more than one form of discrimination.
164 81% of those answering “no” estimated that more than half of respondents would agree
with them. Actual percentage answering “no” = 23%; mean estimated percentage answering
“no” = 64%. See infra Figure 3.
Those who answered the statutory language question “yes” were in the majority (actual
percentage answering “yes” = 77%), and they accurately estimated that they were in the
majority (mean estimated percentage answering “yes” = 80%).
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responses to the motivating factor question165—as was increased
agreement with the statement, “It is morally wrong to be gay.”166

b. Study 2: Transgender Discrimination (Harris)
Materials. Study 2’s design was identical to that of Study 1 except
that it concerned discrimination on the basis of gender identity
rather than sexual orientation. Respondents received the same
stipulated definition of “sex” as in Study 1, and as with Study 1,
they were excluded from the results if they indicated that they
employed a broader alternative definition when answering
questions. Respondents read the following vignette:
Taylor worked for a website design company that
Taylor’s boss, Bob, owns. Taylor was born biologically
male, and Taylor remains biologically male. But Taylor
is transgender: Taylor identifies as a woman, and in
public Taylor appears to be a woman. So most people
who know Taylor (including Bob) simply assume Taylor
is female.
Bob believes that it is morally wrong to identify as a
member of the opposite sex. Bob also believes that, if Bob
were to knowingly employ someone who is biologically
male but identifies as a woman, or someone who is
biologically female but identifies as a man, that would
make Bob complicit in their immorality.
So when Bob recently learned that Taylor is
transgender, Bob fired Taylor, despite Taylor’s excellent
work performance.
Respondents were then asked to answer the same five statutory
language and jury instruction language questions from Study 1
b = .406, SE = .114, p < .001.
b = .173, SE = .076, p = .025. This result, one of the few with a p value between 0.005
and 0.05, is surprising. One explanation for it might be that those who share the protagonist’s
(i.e., the boss’s) moral views more readily imagine that those moral views actually did
influence his decision, to the extent the vignette left any doubt as to the boss’s reason for
firing the employee. An arguably analogous result, with a similarly high p value, arose in
Study 3 with respect to the “because of” question (but not, as here, with respect to the
“motivating factor” question). See infra note 181.
165
166
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(with the names of the characters changed to track the Study 2
vignette). Respondents answered the same agreement-prediction
(i.e., consensus bias) question as in Study 1, the same high- and lowbenchmark questions, and the same three moral/policy questions
(adapted to address gender identity).167 Finally, respondents were
asked to provide a brief written explanation for why Taylor’s
biological sex does or does not count as a “motivating factor” in Bob’s
decision to fire Taylor.
Results. 242 respondents completed Study 2. Compared to Study
1, respondents were considerably more likely to find the statutory
language applicable in Study 2. Respondents’ moral and policy
views were also considerably less sympathetic to Study 2’s
transgender employee compared to Study 1’s homosexual employee.
Otherwise, the results of Studies 1 and 2 were similar.
Statutory language. As shown in Figures 1 and 2 below, most
respondents found the statutory language applicable to transgender
discrimination as described in the vignette. Specifically, 90% of
respondents deemed the “motivating factor” language applicable,168
while 85% deemed the “because of” language applicable.169
Moral/policy view association with statutory language. As with
Study 1, responses to the three moral/policy statements showed no
significant association with responses to the “because of” question.
With respect to the “motivating factor” question, also similar to
Study 1, increased “yes” responses were significantly associated
with an increase in agreement with the statement, “It should
generally be illegal to fire somebody for being transgender.”170
Moral/policy view comparison with Study 1. Consistent with
nationwide polling data,171 respondents exhibited greater antitransgender sentiment in Study 2 than the degree of anti-gay
sentiment respondents exhibited in Study 1. Specifically, compared
167 Exclusion criteria were the same as in Study 1. See supra notes 154, 156, 158 and
accompanying text.
168 Mean = 1.39.
169 Mean = 1.57.
170 b = .279, SE =.089, p = .002.
171 See, e.g., Daniel C. Lewis et al., Degrees of Acceptance: Variation in Public Attitudes
Toward Segments of the LGBT Community, 70 POL. RSCH. Q. 861, 861 (2017) (analyzing
Americans’ attitudes toward and level of “support for nondiscrimination protections” for
lesbian, gay, bisexual, and transgender people and “find[ing] that public attitudes are
significantly more negative toward transgender people and policies pertaining to them than
they are toward gay men and lesbians and related policies”).
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to each analogous question in Study 1, respondents exhibited
significantly lower rates of agreement with the statements, “It is
wrong to fire somebody because they are transgender”172 and “It
should generally be illegal to fire somebody because they are
transgender,” compared to each analogous question in Study 1.173

c. Study 3: Gender-Stereotype Discrimination (Price
Waterhouse)
Study 3’s design was similar to Studies 1 and 2, but its substance
concerned discrimination on the basis of gender stereotypes—a form
of discrimination that, unlike sexual-orientation and transgender
discrimination, the Supreme Court has long held is covered by Title
VII’s statutory language.174 The primary motivation for Study 3 was
to determine whether a type of discrimination clearly prohibited
under current Title VII caselaw would be considered more clearly
encompassed within the plain statutory language.
Materials. As with Studies 1 and 2, respondents were instructed
to apply the stipulated definition of “sex” and were excluded if they
indicated that they applied a more capacious definition. Study 3
respondents read the following vignette:175

Study 2 mean = 1.66; Study 1 mean = 1.39; t(462) = 3.469, p = 0.001.
Study 2 mean = 1.67; Study 1 mean = 1.41; t(462) = 3.245, p = 0.001. In Study 2,
respondents also agreed more with the statement, “It is morally wrong to be transgender,”
compared to the analogous statement in Study 1; however, the difference was not statistically
significant. Study 2 mean = 2.97, Study 1 mean = 3.05; t(462) = 0.801, p = 0.423.
174 See Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228 (1989) (plurality opinion).
175 Note that whereas the employer-protagonists in Studies 1 and 2 fire the employees out
of a sense of moral obligation, the employer-protagonist in Study 3 denies the employee a
promotion out of a sense of good business strategy. There were two reasons for this difference:
first, a desire to stick closer to the facts of Price Waterhouse (and, in Studies 1 and 2, to the
facts in those cases, such as the employer’s explicitly moral-religious reason for
discriminating against transgender people in the Harris case); second, a concern that
respondents might find it less natural or believable to consider an employer who thinks, in
the abstract, that it is morally wrong to fail to fit gender stereotypes (compared to the relative
plausibility of imagining an employer who thinks it morally wrong to be gay or transgender).
Of course, this difference in employer motivation and action leads to possible alternative
explanations of any differences observed in responses to Studies 1 and 2, on the one hand,
and Study 3 on the other. Therefore, additional caution is warranted in drawing direct
comparisons between the results of Study 3 and the other studies.
172
173
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Sandy worked for a website design company that
Sandy’s boss, Brett, owns. Sandy is a male, but—unlike
his co-worker, Mark—Sandy doesn’t act like a
stereotypical, masculine man. In fact, most people who
know Sandy (including Brett) consider Sandy much
more feminine than a typical male.
Brett believes that employees who don’t fit traditional
gender stereotypes make ineffective leaders. Brett also
believes that, if he were to promote to a leadership
position a male who seems unusually feminine, or a
female who seems unusually masculine, that would
make Brett a bad businessman.
So when Brett recently considered whether to promote
Mark or Sandy to a new leadership position, Brett
decided to deny Sandy the promotion and give it to Mark
instead, despite Sandy’s excellent work performance.
Respondents were then asked to answer the same questions as
in Studies 1 and 2 (with names and attributes changed to fit the
vignette).176
Results. 214 respondents completed Study 3. The statutory
language and jury instruction questions elicited “yes” responses at
approximately the same rate as Study 1 (sexual orientation), rather
than at the higher rate of “yes” responses observed in Study 2
(transgender).177 Otherwise, the results of Study 3 were similar to
both Studies 1 and 2.
176 Exclusion criteria were the same as in Studies 1 and 2. See supra notes 154, 156, 158
and accompanying text.
177 More specifically, pairwise comparisons (Bonferroni-corrected) between responses to the
“motivating factor” question for each vignette showed that responses were significantly closer
to the “Clearly YES” end of the spectrum in response to the transgender vignette than were
responses to the same question in response to the sexual orientation and the gender
discrimination vignettes (p < 0.001). Pairwise comparison revealed no significant difference
in responses to the “motivating factor” question among those who responded to the sexual
orientation vignette compared to those who responded to the sex stereotype vignette. The
same was true of responses to the “because of” question. While responses were significantly
closer to the “Clearly YES” end of the spectrum in response to the transgender vignette (p <
0.001), pairwise comparison of the “because of” responses for the sexual orientation and
gender stereotype questions showed that those responses were not significantly different.
Welch’s ANOVA was used to compare responses to the “motivating factor” and “because of”
questions across vignettes. Welch’s ANOVA was more appropriate than classical ANOVA
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Statutory language. As shown in Figures 1 and 2 below, most
respondents found the statutory language applicable to the gender
stereotype discrimination described in the vignette. 75% of
respondents deemed the “motivating factor” language applicable,178
and 64% deemed the “because of” language applicable.179
Moral/policy view association with statutory language. As with
Studies 1 and 2, an increase in “yes” responses to the “motivating
factor” question was significantly associated with an increase in
agreement with the statement, “It should generally be illegal to
deny somebody a promotion because they fail to conform to gender
stereotypes.”180 Unlike in Studies 1 and 2, agreement with that
same statement also showed significant association with increased
“yes” responses to the “because of” question.181

d. Study 4: Testing a Motivated-Blaming Theory
(Bostock/Zarda with Moral Valence Flipped)
The motivation for Study 4 was to determine the extent to which
respondents’ ascription of statutory causation in Study 1 (and, by
implication, perhaps Studies 2 and 3 as well) might be attributable
to their finding the action in question blameworthy, as opposed to
simply finding the language applicable.182 In other words, it sought
to test the possible influence of blame-based motivated reasoning on

because the variances of the three groups were significantly different (Fligner-Killeen test of
homogeneity of variances: χ2 = 26.406, p < 0.001) and the size of each group was different
(Study 1: N = 223, Study 2: N = 242, Study 3: N = 214).
178 Mean = 1.85. See infra Figure 1.
179 Mean = 2.16. See infra Figure 2.
180 b = .376, SE = .106, p < .001.
181 b = .300, SE = .106, p = .005. As noted above, see supra note 159, there was also a
statistically significant association between “yes” responses to the “because of” question and
agreement with the statement, “Employees who don’t fit traditional gender stereotypes make
ineffective leaders.” b = .200, SE = .094, p = .034. Note that this differed somewhat from the
analogous prompt for Studies 1 and 2. In those studies, the prompt asked for respondents’
degree of agreement with the statement, “It is morally wrong to X,” where X was “be gay”
(Study 1) or “be transgender” (Study 2). The question was adapted for Study 3 so that it
maintained those questions’ emphasis on the reason the employer himself articulated for
engaging in the adverse employment decision. Whereas that reason was the employer’s moral
view in Studies 1 and 2, it was his view about effective leadership in Study 3. See supra note
175 (explaining the motivation for this difference in Study 3).
182 See supra notes 159, 170, 181 and accompanying text.
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respondents’ interpretations of the statutory language.183 Study 4’s
design was therefore nearly identical to Study 1 but with a twist:
The vignette concerned Gene’s co-worker, Janet, who decides to
warn Gene about their boss’s views. Rather than ask about the boss
(whose actions participants disapproved of in Study 1), Study 4
asked about Janet, whose actions respondents would likely deem
non-blameworthy.184
Materials. As with Studies 1, 2, and 3, respondents were
instructed to apply the stipulated definition of “sex” and were
excluded if they indicated that they applied a more capacious
definition. Study 4 respondents read the following vignette
(Differences from the Study 1 vignette are underlined here for ease
of reference, but respondents’ version did not contain underlining):
Gene worked for a website design company that his
boss, Bill, owns. Gene is a gay male, but he isn’t very
open about his sexual orientation, and he doesn’t act the
way many people associate with being gay. So most
people who know Gene (including Bill) simply assume
Gene is straight.
Bill believes that it is morally wrong to be attracted
to the same sex. Bill also believes that, if he were to
knowingly employ a male who is attracted to other
males, or a female who is attracted to other females, that
would make Bill complicit in their immorality.
Gene didn’t know about Bill’s beliefs, but Gene’s coworker, Janet, did. So when Janet recently learned that
Gene is gay, Janet warned Gene to be careful about
letting Bill find out.
Respondents were then asked to answer the same basic questions
as in Study 1, except that in Study 4 they were asked about Janet’s
decision to warn Gene (rather than about Bill’s decision to fire
Gene).185

183 For an explanation of blame-based motivated reasoning, see Mark D. Alicke, David Rose
& Dori Bloom, Causation, Norm Violation, and Culpable Control, 108 J. PHIL. 670, 675 (2011).
184 See infra note 186.
185 Exclusion criteria were the same as in Studies 1, 2, and 3. See supra notes 154, 156, 158
and accompanying text.
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Results. 204 respondents completed Study 4. The manipulation
of perceived blameworthiness worked in the intended way: In stark
contrast to assessments of the boss’s actions in Study 1, respondents
found Janet’s actions in Study 4 to be non-blameworthy and not
something the law ought to prohibit.186 But despite respondents’
approval of the protagonist’s actions, most respondents still found
the statutory language satisfied. 65% of respondents deemed the
“motivating factor” language applicable;187 58% deemed the
“because of” language applicable.188
Statutory language comparison to Study 1. The “because of”
results show a nearly identical percentage answering “yes” in both
surveys.189 By contrast, while a clear majority continued to answer
“yes” in response to Study 4’s “motivating factor” question, that
majority was twelve percentage points lower in Study 4 compared
to Study 1, a statistically significant difference.190 There are two
possible explanations for the downward shift, both of which likely
have some merit. The first is the motivated blaming explanation:
respondents in Study 4 were less likely to answer “yes” because that
response might imply blame, but they didn’t find the protagonist
blameworthy. The second explanation is that Janet’s motivations
were less clear in Study 4 than the boss’s in Study 1 (whereas the

186 In Study 4, 7% agreed that “It was wrong for Janet to warn Gene about Bill” (mean =
3.06). In Study 1, 88% agreed that “It is wrong to fire somebody because they are gay” (mean
= 1.39). Comparing percentage of “yes” versus “no”: χ2(1) = 216.594, p < 0.001. Comparing
means: t(424) = 20.489, p < 0.001.
In Study 4, 12% agreed that “It should be illegal for Janet to warn Gene about Bill” (mean
= 3.36). In Study 1, 87% agreed that “It should be illegal to fire somebody because they are
gay” (mean = 1.41). Comparing percentage of “yes” versus “no”: χ2(1) = 264.766, p < 0.001.
Comparing means: t(424) = 25.313, p < 0.001.
187 Mean = 2.12. “Clearly yes” = 39%; “Probably yes” = 26%; “Probably no” = 20%; “Clearly
no” = 15%.
188 Mean = 2.30. “Clearly yes” = 35%; “Probably yes” = 23%; “Probably no” = 19%; “Clearly
no” = 23%.
189 The two-percentage-point difference was not statistically significant, nor was the slight
difference in means. Study 1 “yes” percentage = 60%; mean = 2.17. Study 4 “yes” percentage
= 58%; mean = 2.30. The difference in means owes primarily to a greater proportion of the
Study 4 “yes” responses being “probably” as opposed to “clearly” (Study 1 “probably yes” =
13%; Study 4 “probably yes” = 23%).
190 The twelve-percentage-point difference was statistically significant, as was the
difference in means. Study 1 “yes” percentage = 77%; Study 4 “yes” percentage = 65%; χ2(1) =
7.415, p = 0.006. Study 1 mean = 1.75, SD = 1.13; Study 4 mean = 2.12, SD = 1.1; t(425) =
3.45, p = 0.001.
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causal role of Gene’s biological sex was no different).191 The second
explanation might help explain why “motivating factor” responses
changed while “because of” responses did not.192 It might also
explain why, in response to the “motivating factor” question,
respondents were far more likely to choose a “probably” answer
(either “probably yes” or “probably no”) in Study 4, and far more
likely to choose a “clearly” answer in Study 1.193 Respondents, in
short, were less sure of what was going on inside the head of the
protagonist in Study 4.
In the end, even if the first, blame-based motivated reasoning
explanation accounts for the entirety of the variation in “motivating
factor” responses between Study 1 and Study 4,194 it remains the
case that in Study 4—with blame-based reasoning absent—a clear
majority of respondents found both the “motivating factor” and
“because of” language applicable.195
3. Summary of Study Design, Results, and Implications for
Bostock. Respondents in each of the three main experiments read a
short vignette describing an instance of employment discrimination.
Each vignette was modelled on the facts of an actual case but was
designed to focus exclusively on the employee attribute that was the
direct object of the employer’s discriminatory intent. Specifically,
the employer disadvantaged the employee due to the employee’s
sexual orientation (Study 1), gender identity (Study 2), or failure to
fulfill “traditional” gender stereotypes (Study 3). The employer in
each vignette was an equal-opportunity discriminator as between
biological sexes (e.g., someone who has an equal aversion to
employing male-to-female transgender employees and female-toIn Study 1, the boss is described as clearly motivated by a desire, rooted in his beliefs
about morality, not to employ gay people. In Study 4, Janet is not described as being
motivated by anything in particular.
192 See supra notes 189–190 and accompanying text.
193 Specifically, whereas only 21% answered either “probably yes” or “probably no” in
response to Study 1’s “motivating factor” question, more than twice as many (46%) answered
“probably yes” or “probably no” in response to Study 4’s “motivating factor” question. The
change in “probably” responses with respect to the “because of” question was similar in
direction but smaller in magnitude (from 30% in Study 1 to 42% in Study 4).
194 For additional reasons to doubt the magnitude of a motivated blame-based reasoning
explanation of the findings in Studies 1–3, see infra notes 209–210 and accompanying text.
195 As for the remaining questions (the jury instruction, high- and low-benchmark, and
false consensus bias questions), respondents in Study 4 answered them in a manner similar
to how respondents in Studies 1, 2, and 3 answered them. For those results, see
https://osf.io/ce4sk/.
191
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male transgender employees). Using a stipulated enactment-era
definition of an individual’s “sex” (namely, “the property of being
biologically male or female”), respondents answered questions about
the application of the statutory phrases to the events described in
the vignette.196
The results were consistent across all three studies. As Figures
1 and 2 illustrate, a clear majority of respondents found that Title
VII’s plain language encompasses sexual-orientation, transgender,
and gender-stereotype based discrimination. They did so most
resoundingly with respect to transgender discrimination (where
196 To clarify the implications of this approach, it might help to compare it to a different
survey-based approach employed in a recent paper by Shlomo Klapper, Soren Schmidt, and
Tor Tarantola. See Klapper et al., supra note 51, at 25–26. The studies in Klapper, Schmidt,
and Tarantola’s paper directly ask survey participants to draw legal conclusions, whereas
this Article’s studies ask about ordinary meaning. See id. at 25. Consider, for example, the
materials that their subjects responded to in a survey based on Taniguchi v. Kan Pacific
Saipan, Ltd., 566 U.S. 560 (2012):
In some lawsuits, the side that ends up winning can ask the judge to make
the losing side compensate them for some of the expenses they had to incur
during the lawsuit. According to the law, one of the expenses that is eligible
for this kind of compensation request is the services of an “interpreter.”
Suppose that in one case, the winning side hired someone to translate
written documents as part of the lawsuit. After they won, they asked t[he]
judge to make the losing side pay for the services of the translator. The losing
side disputed that this counted as an interpreter.
How much do you agree with the following statement:
The written translator’s services are eligible for compensation.
Klapper et al., supra note 51, at 27–28 (emphasis removed). In contrast, this Article’s
studies, if applied to the issue in Taniguchi, would provide participants with something like
the following prompt: “Al hired Bert to translate some of Al’s documents from one language
to another. Bert translated the documents, and Al paid him for his services. By translating
the documents, did Bert act as Al’s interpreter?”
As the example illustrates, this Article’s study, unlike Klapper et al.’s, does not ask
participants to perform the more cognitively demanding and bias-prone task of deriving legal
conclusions. See Lawrence Solum, Download of the Week: “Ordinary Meaning from Ordinary
People” by Klapper, Schmidt, & Tor, LEGAL THEORY BLOG (June 6, 2020, 9:00 AM),
https://lsolum.typepad.com/legaltheory/2020/06/download-of-the-week-ordinary-meaningfrom-ordinary-people-by-klapper-schmidt-tor.html (“[Klapper et al.’s] research design
conflates the interpretation-construction distinction, assuming that legal effect is
meaning. The research subjects are asked only about applications (construction) and not
about communicative content (interpretation).”); cf. Ward Farnsworth, Dustin Guzior & Anup
Malani, Policy Preferences and Legal Interpretation, 1 J.L. & CTS. 115, 116 (2013) (adopting
a similar approach to Klapper et al. in a survey of law students); Ben-Shahar et al., supra
note 157, at 1783–84 (adopting a similar approach to Klapper et al. in the context of contract
interpretation).
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90% of respondents considered the “motivating factor” language
satisfied, and 85% considered the “because of” language satisfied).
But they also did so with respect to sexual-orientation
discrimination (where 77% of respondents considered the
“motivating factor” language satisfied, and 60% considered the
“because of” language satisfied). And they appeared no more likely
to deem the statutory language applicable to more traditional Price
Waterhouse-style gender stereotype discrimination (indeed,
compared to transgender discrimination, respondents were
considerably less inclined to find Price Waterhouse’s discrimination
covered by the statute).197
FIGURE 1:
“Was [employee’s] sex a motivating factor in [employer’s]
decision to fire [employee]?”

Sexual
Orientation

Transgender

Gender
Stereotype

4% 6%
14%

16%
13%

8%
13%

197

77%

63%

Clearly Yes

11%

Probably Yes

Probably No

21%

54%

Clearly No

See supra note 177 and accompanying text.

Published by Digital Commons @ University of Georgia School of Law, 2022

47

Georgia Law Review, Vol. 56, Iss. 1 [2022], Art. 2

48

GEORGIA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 56:1

FIGURE 2:
“Was [employee] fired because of [employee’s] sex?”
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Gender
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Finally, as Figure 3 illustrates, in all three studies, the
respondents in the minority (i.e., those who deemed the statutory
language inapplicable) exhibited significant false consensus bias,
mistakenly believing themselves to be in the majority and
predicting on average that anywhere from two to five times more
people shared their interpretation than was actually the case.198

198 In Study 1, 81% of those answering “no” estimated that more than half of respondents
would agree with them. In Study 2, the figure was 63%, and in Study 3, 69%.
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FIGURE 3:
False Consensus Bias
“100 other people are taking this survey. Out of the 100, how
many do you predict will agree with you and answer [‘NO’]?”
75

50

25

0
Sexual Orientation

Transgender
Actual

Gender Stereotype

Predicted

The implications for Bostock are straightforward. The employees’
interpretation better accords with the statutory language’s OPM
than does the employers’ interpretation.199 Of course, numerous
judges and commentators have reached the opposite conclusion.
And in doing so, they’ve been especially emphatic in their embrace
of the “ordinary reader” test as the sole determinant of their
interpretation.200 But their confidence may be reminiscent of the
false consensus bias exhibited by the survey respondents who
adopted the same (minority) interpretation;201 it belies the actual
evidence of ordinary reader understanding. As for Justice Gorsuch’s

199 And the results may favor the plaintiffs in other civil rights litigation raising similar
interpretive questions. See Bostock v. Clayton Cnty., 140 S. Ct. 1731, 1791–96 app. C (2020)
(Alito, J., dissenting) (referencing over 100 federal statutes with similar language); Wittmer
v. Phillips 66 Co., 915 F.3d 328, 337–38 (5th Cir. 2019) (Ho, J., concurring) (“[B]ecause federal
statutes governing educational institutions employ language indistinguishable from Title
VII, this debate also affects virtually every school, college, dormitory, athletic activity, and
locker room in America.”); Macleod, supra note 14, at 959–61 (citing examples of courts
importing ordinary meaning determinations from one statute to another, even where the
statutes address very different concerns). But see Tobia & Mikhail, supra note 38, at 17
(finding less plaintiff-friendly results in cases of interracial marriage and pregnancy
discrimination, despite those contexts’ similar interpretive structure).
200 See, e.g., supra notes 24–29, 77–83 and accompanying text.
201 See supra Figure 3.
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majority opinion in Bostock, it needn’t have made its muchcriticized “retreat”202 away from “ordinary” meaning and toward a
“technical” or “literalistic” interpretation of the relevant causal
language.203 What critics deride as an “outlandish judicial
performance,” “unrestrained in the license it takes” with the text’s
OPM,204 turns out to be demonstrably tethered to the text’s OPM,
even if the Bostock majority did not offer a full-throated OPM-based
defense.205
The best way to further sharpen and test these conclusions is to
consider potential objections and explain why they’re ultimately
unpersuasive.206
Blackman & Barnett, supra note 76; see supra note 76 and accompanying text.
See Blackman & Barnett, supra note 76; Bostock, 140 S. Ct. at 1824 (Kavanaugh, J.,
disenting).
204 Lund, supra note 76, at 185.
205 See supra note 78 and accompanying text.
206 Before moving to more specific objections, here I’ll address a broader concern raised in
two insightful draft papers that were recently posted online. See Mitchell N. Berman & Guha
Krishnamurthi, Bostock Was Bogus: Textualism, Pluralism, and Title VII, 97 NOTRE DAME
L.
REV.
(forthcoming
2021)
[hereinafter
B&K],
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3777519;
Benjamin
Eidelson,
Dimensional Disparate Treatment, 95 S. CAL. L. REV. (forthcoming 2022),
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3915787. Both papers emphasize that
textualists care about “reasonable” reader understanding, which can differ from the average
reader’s understanding. B&K at 26–27; Eidelson, supra, at 50–52. So far, so good: this
Article’s studies were designed to prompt responses that reflect the “reasonable” reader’s
understanding, using criteria for reasonableness that were derived from textualism’s
commitments and specified in advance of learning the study results. For example, the
“reasonable” reader is attentive, hence the use of attention check screening in this Article’s
experimental materials. Compare B&K at 25–26 (arguing that Tobia & Mikhail’s study, supra
note 38, which did not use attention or comprehension checks to screen out any participants,
resulted in unreliable responses evincing participants’ “carelessness or confusion”), with
supra notes 154–155, 158–159, 162 and accompanying text (describing this Article’s studies’
attention and comprehension checks). Additionally, the “reasonable” reader’s understanding
is not influenced by her own moral views or preferences, hence the inclusion of materials that
test whether readers’ moral views influenced their interpretations. See supra notes 166–167,
170–173, 180–181, Section III.B.2.d. Her understanding of the text is not influenced by
legislative history, hence the exclusion of any legislative history information. See Section
III.B.2.
But there can be reasonable disagreement concerning the criteria for “reasonable reader
understanding” that best reflect textualism’s commitments. (Indeed, this Article aims to
encourage textualists to explicitly confront their implicit disagreements concerning those
criteria, and Part IV is dedicated to exploring some of those hidden fault lines.) In that vein,
Eidelson makes an interesting suggestion—namely, that textualism’s “reasonable member of
202
203
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4. Objections and Responses.
a. Interpreter Bias
The first objection goes as follows. Perhaps these studies don’t
actually reveal how people ordinarily understand and use the

the public,” applying the phrase “because of such individual’s X” in response to any given set
of facts, would take into account the fact that she is interpreting a law. Eidelson, supra, at
48–53. Why would textualists’ reasonable reader consider that relevant? It can’t be, for
example, that it leads her to adjust her understanding of the text to arrive at what she
considers a good legal outcome, or that the legal context leads her to use whatever nontextualist method of interpretation the enactment-era Congress might have expected judges
to use. Cf. infra notes 229 and 282 and accompanying text. Instead, the fact that it’s a law is
relevant for the reasonable reader because it leads her to ensure that her case-specific
judgments conform to an “analysis” of the relevant language capable of being applied
consistently across cases. Eidelson, supra, at 53–54. Accordingly, textualism’s “reasonable”
reader will understand the words “because of” in Title VII to possess a consistent meaning
across all cases concerning the phrase “because of such individual’s X,” regardless of whether
“X” is “race, color, religion, sex, or national origin.” Id. at 53–57. But—and here’s the
concern—the ordinary readers responding to this Article’s surveys, unaware of the legal
context, might render judgments in individual cases that turn out to be impossible to
incorporate into a coherent legal rule applicable across cases. See id. at 52–55; B&K at 26
(arguing that the “patterns of responses across the scenarios” in Tobia and Mikhail’s study
“undermine the[] reliability” of Tobia and Mikhail’s results).
My response to this concern is simple: there needn’t be any contradiction between a
generally applicable analysis of “because of” on the one hand and this Article’s study results
on the other. My response is admittedly incomplete because this Article doesn’t supply the
generally applicable analysis of “because of” that fits the Article’s study results. Still, there
are likely many such accounts. Perhaps the best is Eidelson’s “dimensional account,” which
sets forth what amounts to an elegant rule that applies consistently across cases and appears
to fit ordinary linguistic and conceptual intuitions—including those reflected in this Article’s
study results—along with modern judge-made disparate impact caselaw. See Eidelson, supra,
at 19–48. Or perhaps the best such account would be less of an elegant rule and more of a
flexible standard, preserving an even greater number of case-specific intuitions by
incorporating additional factors that appear to influence lay and legally trained readers’
causal judgments. Cf. infra note 282 (discussing textualists’ preference for rules over
standards and suggesting that it is not a necessary outgrowth of textualist theory); Joshua
Knobe & Scott Shapiro, Proximate Cause Explained: An Essay in Experimental
Jurisprudence, 88 U. CHI. L. REV. 165, 181–97, 235–36 (2021) (discussing modern research
concerning ordinary people’s causal selection judgments and noting the resemblance of those
judgments to judge-developed proximate cause doctrine). In any event, there’s no reason to
presume that people have such incoherent understandings of common causal language that
their responses to a given case—under experimental conditions designed to avoid or detect
the influence of biases or misunderstandings—should be considered unreasonable even
absent evidence of such biases or misunderstandings.
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relevant statutory language. Instead, they reveal only that people
dislike employers who discriminate against LGBT employees and
will choose whichever survey response expresses that dislike. If
those who answered “yes” to the statutory causation questions did
so merely to express condemnation of the employer, perhaps the
results are not to be trusted as a source of information about plain
meaning.
The experimental data undermine this objection in several ways.
First, recall the results in Study 4, where respondents were asked
about the applicability of the statutory language to an actor whom
they considered blameless or even praiseworthy.207 The bias
objection would predict that the results would be reversed, with
most respondents deeming the statutory language inapplicable. But
that didn’t happen; instead, the Study 4 results were similar to the
Study 1 results, with a clear majority continuing to deem the
statutory language applicable.208 Second, recall that statutory
causation ascription was the highest in response to the transgender
discrimination vignette despite respondents’—and the U.S.
public’s—relatively low assessment of the blameworthiness of
employer transgender discrimination compared to sexualorientation discrimination.209 Again, the bias objection would
predict the opposite. Third, individual respondents showed
sensitivity to small variations in questions, suggesting that they
were not merely “seeing red” and answering “yes” to express
blame.210 Taken together, these findings show that moral biases,
even if present, were far from decisive in determining responses to
the statutory language questions.211

See supra notes 183–185 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 186–190 and accompanying text.
209 See supra notes 168–173 and accompanying text.
210 For example, the respondents’ answers to the statutory causation questions tracked
small variations of causal language at issue (e.g., different responses for “because of” and
“motivating factor”), supra note 162, and variations in the employee attribute at issue (e.g.,
different responses for “sex” and “sexual orientation”), supra note 163.
211 For an overview of the current debate in experimental philosophy regarding the role of
blame in causality ascription, see Justin Sytsma, The Character of Causation: Investigating
the Impact of Character, Knowledge, and Desire on Causal Attributions 2–8 (Dec. 28, 2019)
(unpublished manuscript), http://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/16739/, and Icard et al., supra note
89.
207
208
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b. Linguistic Drift
The second kind of potential objection is based on the notion of
linguistic drift. It concerns the studies’ relevance for finding original
public meaning, as opposed to merely present-day public meaning.
Perhaps the ordinary meaning of the words in the statute has
changed since 1964 (the initial enactment of Title VII)212 or 1991
(the amendment adding the “motivating factor” language).213 As a
result, one cannot infer, based on ordinary readers’ understanding
today, what ordinary readers’ understanding would have been at
the time of enactment. In fact, so the objection goes, responses to
the survey would have been different in 1964 and 1991 in the
following way: most respondents back then (unlike now) would not
have found the statutory language applicable to the events
described in the experimental vignettes. And that difference is due
to post-enactment change(s) in the ordinary meaning of the statute’s
words.214
To evaluate this objection, let’s first consider its application to
the statute’s causal language and then its application to the term
“sex.” As to causation, I have been unable to find a single judge,
lawyer, or commentator who has claimed that the ordinary meaning
of the words “because of” or “motivating factor” has changed since
1964 or 1991. Nor have I been able to find research in other
disciplines suggesting that such a drift has occurred; to the
contrary, a robust literature in experimental philosophy and
cognitive science finds remarkable consistency in causal cognition
and use of causal language across time and culture.215 Absent any
explanation for or evidence of the posited drift in causal cognition
42 U.S.C. § 2000e.
42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(m).
214 On distinct claims about post-enactment drift in values, preferences, biases, and so
forth, as opposed to linguistic drift, see supra note 32 and infra Sections III.B.4.a, IV.B.
215 For accounts of causality ascription as partially norm-dependent, see Icard et al., supra
note 89, at 80–81, and Jonathan F. Kominsky & Jonathan Phillips, Immoral Professors and
Malfunctioning Tools: Counterfactual Relevance Accounts Explain the Effect of Norm
Violations on Causal Selection, 43 COGNITIVE SCI., 2019, at 32. Note, however, that such
accounts do not claim that the concept of causation—or the meaning of causal language—
changes as norms change. Cf. Christopher R. Green, Originalism and the Sense-Reference
Distinction, 50 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 555, 559–60 (2006); Wis. Cent. Ltd. v. United States, 138 S.
Ct. 2067, 2074 (2018) (“While every statute’s meaning is fixed at the time of enactment,
new applications may arise in light of changes in the world.”).
212
213
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or language, the core claim on which the objection depends remains
foundationless.
Now consider the linguistic drift objection as applied to the
meaning of “sex.” First, recall that no judge or litigant has claimed
that the ordinary meaning of the word “sex” has changed since 1964;
indeed, those who have addressed the matter (majority, dissenting,
and concurring judges alike) have affirmatively claimed that the
ordinary meaning of the word “sex” has not changed since 1964 or
1991.216 Of course, they could all be wrong. But if they are all wrong,
why assume that the drift has been toward a more, rather than less,
capacious understanding of “sex”? In 1964, before terms like
“gender” and “sexual orientation” were widely used, the term “sex”
would have covered more territory, not less.217 In short, even
assuming linguistic drift, it’s far from obvious that the drift would
lead modern readers to find the statutory language more readily
applicable, rather than less.218
Second, recall that all of the judges and lawyers in the Bostock
litigation stipulated that the term’s ordinary meaning (in 1964 and
today) is captured by the definition, “the property of being
‘biologically male or female.’”219 That, of course, is the meaning
explicitly stipulated in all of the surveys described above.220 Among
other safeguards in survey design, any respondents who indicated
that they used a more capacious definition than the one they were
instructed to apply were excluded from the results.221 So even if
judges and lawyers on both sides are wrong to claim that the
ordinary meaning of “sex” hasn’t changed since 1964, and even if
the direction of the change would favor the employees’
interpretation if left untouched, the surveys’ stipulated definition
requirement provides further reason to doubt that the hypothesized
change in meaning affected the experimental results at all—let

216 See supra note 66 (collecting sources and noting that Judge Posner is the sole arguable
exception).
217 See Eskridge et al., supra note 66, at 1558 (“In 1964, gender and sexual orientation were
uncommon words, and sex included concepts that today we might refer to as gender and
sexual orientation . . . .”).
218 See id. at 1560–64.
219 See supra note 66.
220 See supra Section III.B.2.
221 See supra note 156 and accompanying text.
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alone decisively or in a direction that would hurt, rather than help,
the employers.222

c. Surrounding Text
Another potential objection might claim that the surveys failed
to provide the respondents with enough of the statute’s text. Recall
that the full statutory provision at issue makes it unlawful for an
employer to “fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual, or
otherwise to discriminate against any individual with respect to his
compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment,”
either “because of such individual’s . . . sex,”223 or where such
individual’s sex was a “motivating factor” in the employer’s
challenged employment practice.224 Perhaps the survey should not
have simply asked whether the employer discharged (or, as the
surveys put it, “fired”) the employee “because of [the employee’s]
sex.” The survey, so one version of the objection goes, should have
instead (or in addition) asked whether the firing constituted
“discrimination against” the employee “because of [the employee’s]
sex.”225
Of course, that objection only has teeth if one thinks that the
answer would be different and that this difference would reflect a
correct reading of the entire statutory provision. In other words, the
objection only makes sense if you think that one can “discharge” an
individual “because of [the employee’s] . . . sex” without thereby
“discharg[ing] any individual, or otherwise . . . discriminat[ing]
against any individual with respect to his compensation, terms,
conditions, or privileges of employment,” on the basis of sex.226 That
strikes me—and seemingly most judges—as a strained reading of
the statute. But who’s to say? Maybe that question should be thrown
222 See supra note 146. For discussion of a distinct set of claims premised on drift in
interpreter values, biases, or background assumptions, see infra Section IV.B.
223 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a).
224 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(m).
225 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a). And, presumably, should have asked whether the employer
“discriminated against” the employee by allowing “sex” to be a “motivating factor” in his
decision to fire her. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(m).
226 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a) (emphasis added). Or that an employee’s race, religion, sex, etc.
can be a “motivating factor” in the decision to terminate the employee without the
termination constituting “discrimination against” the employee on that basis. 42 U.S.C.
§ 2000e-2(m).

Published by Digital Commons @ University of Georgia School of Law, 2022

55

Georgia Law Review, Vol. 56, Iss. 1 [2022], Art. 2

56

GEORGIA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 56:1

to the ordinary reader. So maybe, the objection might proceed, the
respondents should have been given the full language of the statute
(at which point they could interpret “or otherwise discriminate
against” as modifying the earlier verb, “discharge,” if they saw fit).
The survey could then have simply asked whether the statute
prohibits what the employer did in the vignette.227
The problem with this objection is that it proposes an approach
too far afield from textualists’ concern with the ordinary, everyday
meaning of words and phrases. First, consider the possibility of
simply giving respondents the full text of the statutory provision.
This complex, legal-sounding format informs the respondent that
they are interpreting a law.228 As a result, respondents would likely
be influenced (or “biased”) by all sorts extratextual beliefs and
preferences regarding laws and their interpretation—influences
that the textualists’ reasonable ordinary reader treats as irrelevant.
As explained further in Section IV.B, textualists are apparently not
interested in ordinary readers’ implicitly non-textualist approaches
to legal interpretation.229 Instead, textualists are interested in the
ordinary, everyday, non-“legal” meaning of words and phrases,
which they then use to determine the legal effect of those words and

See, e.g., supra note 196 (discussing Klapper et al.’s studies concerning other statutes).
Granted, this may be inevitable with respect to some statutes. Consider, for example,
Smith v. United States, concerning whether trading a gun for narcotics constituted the “use”
of a firearm. 508 U.S. 223, 228‒29 (1993). It might be misleading (in a manner favoring the
prosecution’s interpretation) to present respondents with a vignette in which a protagonist
trades a gun for drugs and then simply ask respondents whether he “used” the gun. Instead,
one might need to ask whether the protagonist used the gun “during and in relation to any
crime of violence or drug trafficking crime.” Id. at 241 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (quoting 18
U.S.C. § 924(c)(1)). Providing the relevant surrounding text here might unavoidably alert the
reader that she is interpreting a law. See John F. Manning, Textualism and the Equity of the
Statute, 101 COLUM. L. REV. 1, 111 (2001) [hereinafter Manning, Textualism and the Equity
of the Statute] (“Focusing on the contextual gloss put upon ‘using a firearm’ in the context of
committing a crime, the Smith dissent arrived at a more plausible conclusion . . . .” (citing
Smith, 508 U.S. at 241 (Scalia, J., dissenting))); United States v. Alvarez-Sanchez, 511 U.S.
350, 358 (1994) (interpreting the phrase “arrest or other detention”); Deal v. United States,
508 U.S. 129, 131‒32 (1993) (interpreting the word “conviction”); cf. Manning, Textualism
and the Equity of the Statute, supra, at 111 n.432 (contrasting the meaning of “drew blood”
when the phrase “appears in the Criminal Code” from when “it appears in the Health Code”).
229 Cf. Struchiner et al., supra note 51, at 327 (demonstrating that ordinary people’s
interpretations of a rule are influenced by considerations of its purpose, even when that
purpose is not reflected in the text of the relevant law).
227
228
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phrases.230 That’s why, when looking for language’s OPM,
textualists turn to examples from everyday usage, popular
dictionaries, and non-legal corpora—rather than, say, popular
beliefs about the purpose of the statute.231
Finally, even if respondents had not been given the full text of
the statutory provisions and had simply been asked, “Did
[Employer] discriminate against [Employee] because of
[Employee’s] sex?,” instead of “Did [Employer] fire [Employee]
because of [Employee’s] sex?,” this framing would still have been
problematic. Once again, the proposal makes sense only if the
statute’s “or otherwise discriminate against” language modifies the
earlier term “discharge.”232 Let’s assume that it does. Still, the
proposal additionally requires that the phrase “‘discriminated
against’ because of X” adds some requirement over and above
merely “‘discharged’ or ‘fired’ because of X.” Justice Kavanaugh
implies at one point that he disavows that additional
requirement,233 but Justice Alito appears to endorse it.234 So let’s
consider it. What exactly would the phrase “discriminate against”
add beyond merely “discharge”? The idea seems to be that it adds
an element of moral judgment—a declaration that the act or actor
was “biased,” “prejudice[d],” “unfair,” and so on.235 Admittedly, if
230 See, e.g., Solum, supra note 196. At least, this is true barring some indication that the
terms at issue are terms of art. See supra notes 1, 106 and accompanying text. But see
Eidelson, supra note 206, at 48–53.
231 For a contrary proposal, see Amy Widman, The Rostrum Principle: Why the Boundaries
of the Public Forum Matter to Statutory Interpretation, 65 FLA. L. REV. 1447, 1463 (2013).
232 See supra note 226 and accompanying text.
233 See Bostock v. Clayton Cnty., 140 S. Ct. 1731, 1826 n.3 (2020) (Kavanaugh, J.,
dissenting) (“[T]he ordinary meaning of the statutory phrase ‘discriminate’ because of sex is
the same as the statutory phrase ‘to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual’
because of sex.”).
234 See, e.g., id. at 1769 n.22 (Alito, J., dissenting) (“‘[D]iscriminate against’ was ‘associated
with negative treatment directed at members of a discrete group.’ . . . Thus, as used in 1964,
‘discrimination because of sex’ would have been understood to mean discrimination against a
woman or a man based on ‘unfair beliefs or attitudes’ about members of that particular sex.”
(quoting Phillips, supra note 115, at 5, 7)). But see supra notes 121–125 and accompanying
text (arguing that the Phillips study from which Alito derives this conclusion fails to support
it).
235 Id. (emphasis added) (quoting Phillips, supra note 115, at 7). Judgments of causal
selection and causal strength also involve an element of normativity, though not necessarily
moral normativity. See Icard et al., supra note 89, at 88; Knobe & Shapiro, supra note 206, at
190‒96 (discussing the relationship between causal judgments, norm violations, and
blameworthiness).
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that’s so—i.e., if the statute’s use of the term “discrimination” does
indeed impose a requirement that the act be considered morally
wrong as determined by enactment-era popular morality—then the
dissenters’ interpretation may indeed win the day in Bostock236 (as
well as in many anti-discrimination precedents that have come
out—mistakenly, on this view—in favor of plaintiffs237).

d. How Clear is “Clear”?
A final type of potential objection is narrower: even if the
experimental findings show that the employees have the better
reading as a matter of OPM, the findings don’t show that the text’s
OPM is so clear that the cases can or should be resolved through
ordinary public meaning analysis alone.238 At most, the results show
that the text is vague or ambiguous. Granted, all judges who have
opined on the matter claim otherwise,239 and textualists are
famously reluctant to conclude that the OPM of statutory language
is unclear.240 But, it can happen.241 Maybe Title VII’s text is
sufficiently unclear to make even textualists conclude that it is
ambiguous, turning to extratextual considerations (e.g., legislative
history, normative values, etc.) to resolve the dispute.242
There are two ways textualists might spell out such a claim, but
each one commits them to a position that they’d be unwilling to
accept. First, the textualist might claim that the experiments reveal
insufficient rates of interpreter agreement to render the text

236 On the other hand, even Justice Alito seemingly claims that the majority’s
interpretation fails absent any such requirement of enactment-era popular immorality: “Even
if we totally disregard the societal norms of 1964, the text of Title VII does not support the
Court’s holding.” Bostock, 140 S. Ct. at 1774 (Alito, J., dissenting).
237 E.g., Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228 (1989) (plurality opinion) (holding that
Title VII prohibits discrimination based on gender stereotyping, regardless of how prevalent
or accepted gender stereotype-based decision-making was in 1964).
238 See supra notes 5, 44.
239 See supra note 66.
240 See supra note 4.
241 See, e.g., Kethledge, supra note 4, at 320 (admitting that, despite never having found a
statutory ambiguity in ten years as a federal judge, “statutory ambiguities . . . happen, but
they are pretty rare” (emphasis added)).
242 See infra note 278 and accompanying text.

https://digitalcommons.law.uga.edu/glr/vol56/iss1/2

58

Macleod: Finding Original Public Meaning

2021]

FINDING ORIGINAL PUBLIC MEANING

59

“clear.”243 For example, the claim might be that, whatever the line
is for textual “clarity,” it must be above the 60% agreement observed
with respect to the statute’s “because of” language and sexualorientation discrimination, and perhaps even above the 77%
agreement observed with respect to the statute’s “motivating factor”
language and sexual-orientation discrimination.244 This strikes me
as a more demanding standard than textualists would embrace,
even if not impossibly demanding.245 Still, could textualist judges
really demand more than the 90% agreement observed in the
transgender context?246 Put another way, if at the time Title VII was
enacted, 90% of ordinary readers would have considered its plain
language to prohibit what we now call transgender discrimination,
could textualists really maintain that the 10% of ordinary readers
who would have disagreed effectively reveal the statute’s ordinary
meaning to be unclear? If so, plain meaning interpretation would be
dead in its tracks. Textualists would not be willing to accept such a
demanding standard of ordinary reader consensus.
A second, alternative form of the objection might focus not on the
percentage of ordinary readers who agree or disagree, but rather on
the degree of confidence exhibited by interpreters adopting what
243 See Mark Tushnet, Bostock and Originalism, YALE UNIV. PRESS BLOG (July 15, 2020),
http://blog.yalebooks.com/2020/07/15/bostock-and-originalism/ (“One difficulty with original
public meaning originalism can be called ‘quantitative.’ When you try to figure out what a
reasonable person would have understood the words to mean, you rapidly find out, almost
always, that some reasonable people understood the words to mean one thing while other
reasonable people understood them to mean something different.”).
244 See supra notes 160–169 and accompanying text.
245 See, e.g., Bostock v. Clayton Cnty., 140 S. Ct. 1731, 1828 (2020) (Kavanaugh, J.,
dissenting) (“[C]ourts heed how ‘most people’ ‘would have understood’ the text of a statute
when enacted” (emphasis added) (quoting New Prime Inc. v. Oliveira, 139 S. Ct. 532, 539
(2019))); Kavanaugh, supra note 2, at 2137 (discussing the difficulty of setting a “clarity
threshold” to determine when a statute is unambiguous).
In their recent draft, Berman and Krishnamurthi write that the “because of” results
concerning sexual-orientation discrimination “seem[] to us as supportive of the conclusion
that the locution has no ordinary meaning than that it bears the ordinary meaning that
Gorsuch claimed for it.” B&K, supra note 206, at 25; see supra Figure 2. I’m very sympathetic
to the claim that this degree of dissensus should lead interpreters to resolve the dispute on
grounds other than the text’s supposed “plain meaning.” But to reiterate, I’m skeptical that
most textualists would be willing to do so in practice. Cf. Kavanaugh, supra note 2, at 2129;
Kethledge, supra note 4, at 320. In any event, Berman and Krishnamurthi argue that as a
matter of textualist interpretation, the text here is clear, though they contend that its sole
“ordinary meaning” is the Bostock dissenters’ favored meaning. B&K, supra note 4, at 3–5.
246 See supra note 168 and accompanying text.
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turns out to be the minority interpretation. Recall that in all of the
studies reported above, those who deemed the statutory language
inapplicable, and were therefore in the minority, nonetheless
incorrectly believed that theirs was the majority interpretation—
often believing that more than three times as many people agreed
with their interpretation than was actually the case.247 And in the
Title VII LGBT litigation, judges adopting that same minority
interpretation have, if anything, been even more emphatic in their
ordinary meaning claims than the majority judges who, it turns out,
actually reflect most ordinary readers’ understanding.248 Perhaps
statutory language must be deemed “unclear” whenever
interpreters in the minority (whether ordinary readers or judges
channeling them) possess such high (albeit mistaken) confidence.
Perhaps. But I suspect that this second gloss would prove just as
untenable as the first. False consensus bias appears to be
ubiquitous among ordinary readers and judges alike.249 If
textualists were this deferential toward interpreters who
confidently (but mistakenly) claim that their interpretation tracks
ordinary reader understanding, plain meaning interpretation
would again be dead in its tracks. Instead, modern Supreme Court
decisions are replete with examples of dueling majority and
dissenting opinions confidently making conflicting claims about the
plain meaning of statutory text.250 Faced with disagreement over
OPM, textualist judges don’t (and wouldn’t be willing to) retreat to
the position that the text must be unclear after all.251

IV. TEXTUALISM’S UNASKED QUESTIONS
So when the text’s OPM is in fact “clear,” why do judges reach
such starkly contradictory conclusions about it? The previous Part
suggested one explanation: interpreters often lack probative

See supra Figure 3.
See, e.g., supra notes 73–74 and accompanying text.
249 See Solan et al., supra note 155, at 1285–94 (providing experimental evidence of both
laypeople and judges exhibiting false consensus bias in contract interpretation); see also
James A. Macleod, Reporting Certainty, 2019 BYU L. REV. 473, 510–11 (discussing lawyers’
and judges’ “over-confidence in the correctness and obviousness of their assertions”).
250 See SLOCUM, supra note 23, at 292–97 app. D.
251 See id.; cf. Alex Stein, Law and the Epistemology of Disagreements, 96 WASH. U. L. REV.
51, 96–97 (2018).
247
248
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evidence of OPM. They speculate about ordinary reader
understanding without ever asking ordinary readers. Lacking
evidence that could justifiably move them toward consensus, they
become increasingly entrenched in their initial hunches, bolstered
by confirmation and false-consensus biases.
This Part offers a second, complimentary explanation:
interpreters often implicitly invoke different conceptions of OPM—
that is, they make different assumptions about what exactly they’re
looking for evidence of in the first place. While textualists agree that
the text’s OPM is determined by enactment-era reasonable reader
understanding, they often implicitly disagree—with each other, and
with themselves from case to case—about the sense of reader
“understanding” at issue.252 The applied-meaning-experiment
method brings these implicit disagreements to light. Textualists’
divergent conceptions of readers’ relevant “understanding,” and
hence, of OPM, correspond to textualists’ divergent answers to the
following two questions, posed here in the terms of the appliedmeaning-experiment method: (1) What type of question would reveal
readers’ relevant “understanding”? (2) What types of extratextual
information would textualists’ “reasonable” reader treat as relevant
to answering it?253
Confronting each of these questions illuminates often overlooked
but highly consequential ambiguities at the heart of textualist
theory. The resolution of each ambiguity determines outcomes of
many cases, and textualists’ failure to explicitly address either
ambiguity helps explain the stubborn persistence of inter-textualist
disagreement. Without principled resolution, each ambiguity
threatens to undermine textualism as a theory of interpretation,
rendering it normatively unattractive at best and theoretically
incoherent at worst. In what follows, I outline each ambiguity in
more detail and provide examples of the way its resolution affects
case outcomes. I then suggest how textualists ought to resolve each
ambiguity if they are to preserve textualism’s theoretical coherence
and honor its stated normative commitments.

See infra notes 261–262 and accompanying text.
A third question—how clear is “clear”—comes into play only after these two questions
have been answered. See supra note 44; Section III.B.4.d.
252
253
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A. WHAT TYPE OF QUESTION REVEALS RELEVANT

“UNDERSTANDING”?

The first ambiguity concerns the type of question one imagines
textualists’ ordinary reader answering to reveal her
“understanding” of the statutory language. There are two broad
possibilities. First, she could be answering a yes-or-no question of
the form, “Is X a Y?” If and only if the answer is “yes,” then the
statute’s explicit mention of Y encompasses X. Drawing on Hart’s
famous “no vehicles in the park” hypothetical, this first approach is
akin to pointing at, say, a baby stroller, and asking the ordinary
reader, “Is that a vehicle?”254 This was the approach utilized in the
experimental survey studies reported in Section III.B, where
respondents were shown an instance of, e.g., sexual-orientation
discrimination, and were then asked whether the event described
was also an instance of sex discrimination. I’ll call this the “Applied”
approach to ordinary public meaning.255 It elucidates the extension
and boundaries of a statutory term’s application, situating the
interpretive query in the basic factual context that gave rise to the
interpretive dispute. In Bostock, the majority at times appears to
favor an Applied approach to determining the text’s ordinary public
meaning.256

See Hart, supra note 45, at 607 (presenting the no-vehicles hypothetical). But see
Goldfarb, supra note 2, at 9–12 (drawing on the no-vehicles example to illustrate “category
membership” determinations and arguing that they arrive at conclusions that differ from
“Ordinary/Typical Understanding”: “[F]or purposes of Ordinary/Typical Understanding, the
interpretive context does not encompass the specific interpretive question that is to be
decided. Situations in which the discussion focuses on the meaning of a word or the scope of
a category are out of the ordinary . . . .”).
255 For those familiar with the interpretation-construction distinction, it may be worth
noting that the choice of an Applied approach (or any alternative to it) occurs prior to the
“construction” stage. This is true even on a relatively expansive construal of “construction,”
such as Larry Solum’s. See Lawrence B. Solum, The Interpretation-Construction Distinction,
27 CONST. COMMENT. 95, 103, 105 n.21 (2010) [hereinafter Solum, The InterpretationConstruction Distinction] (explaining that, on Solum’s stipulated definition of “construction”
as the act of “giving legal effect to an authoritative text,” construction occurs in all cases, even
where it “does no work in determining legal content”).
256 See, e.g., Bostock v. Clayton Cnty., 140 S. Ct. 1731, 1748 (2020) (using an example from
everyday life to illustrate that “[o]ften in life and law” there are multiple “but-for factors” that
bring about some event and framing the relevant question as whether, in ordinary usage, one
would “deny that” an event occurred “because of” each of those factors (emphasis added)).
254
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In contrast, “Abstract” approaches provide the reader only the
facts or the statutory language—not both. An Abstract approach
then asks the reader a more open-ended question to see whether her
initial response contains the missing statutory language or the
missing facts, as the case may be. Abstract approaches, by cutting
off the ordinary reader’s answer after that initial response, produce
a much narrower interpretation of statutory language.
Consider each of the two types of Abstract approach—“facts-only”
and “statute-only”—in turn. A facts-only Abstract approach asks a
question of the form, “What is a Y?” Then, unless people’s first
answer is “X,” X would not count as a Y.257 So, using the “no vehicles
in the park” example, the question might be, while pointing at a
picture of a baby stroller, “What is that?” If people’s initial response
is anything other than “a vehicle,” then a baby stroller doesn’t count
as a vehicle under the statute. In Bostock, a facts-only Abstract
approach would ask, e.g., “Why did [employer] fire [employee]?” If
respondents’ initial answer is “because of [employee’s] sexual
orientation”—or, indeed, anything other than “because of
[employee’s] sex”—then the employee’s “sex” doesn’t count as a
cause of the firing for purposes of the statute.258 In effect, a factsonly Abstract approach asks what word or phrase people would
most naturally use to describe the fact pattern at issue in the

257 I mention a first-answer cutoff for simplicity. One could expand this to, say, their first
five answers (or, for that matter, the answers they give until the point where they pause for
a long time, indicating difficulty coming up with further answers). The key is just that the
Abstract approach uses a cutoff. Without one, the results of the Abstract approach would
produce the same set of applications as the Applied approach (at least in theory). Respondents
in an Abstract approach would eventually name everything that they would have answered
“yes” to in an Applied approach.
258 Abstract approaches run into problems related to the need to specify the “level” of
category with which the ordinary reader should respond. See JOHN R. TAYLOR, LINGUISTIC
CATEGORIZATION 48–53 (3d ed. 2003). For example, consider a facts-only Abstract approach
with respect to a ban on vehicles. When shown a photo of a truck and asked, “What is that?,”
one might respond, “a vehicle,” but one might alternatively respond, “a truck.” So, to truly
operationalize such an approach, one would likely need to give the respondent options, each
at the same “level” of categorization, from which the ordinary reader could choose. This might
not seem troublesome because we all know that trucks are vehicles, so we could just be sure
not to list “truck” as one of the options competing with “vehicle.” But now turn back to the
prohibition on “sex discrimination”: would “sex discrimination” be listed alongside (i.e., on the
same “level” as) “sexual-orientation discrimination,” or would “sex discrimination” instead be
treated as an umbrella term (like “vehicle”), with “sexual-orientation discrimination” a
subcategory (like “truck”)? Making such decisions would in many cases beg the question.
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case.259 In Bostock, the majority readily concedes (as the
experimental data indicate260) that a facts-only Abstract approach
would favor the employers’ interpretation: “If asked by a
friend . . . why they were fired,” Justice Gorsuch writes, “even
today’s plaintiffs would likely respond that it was because they were
gay or transgender, not because of sex.”261 But whereas Justice
Kavanaugh’s dissenting opinion appears to favor this facts-only
Abstract approach, the majority considers it inapposite.262

259 After conceptually replicating the results of Section III.B’s Applied approach, Tobia &
Mikhail, supra note 38, at 15, go on to investigate another variation on an Applied approach—
one that generates something closer to the answer a facts-only Abstract approach would
generate. Specifically, Tobia & Mikhail ask their respondents to select one among the
following four descriptions: (A) “[Employee] was fired because of his sex.”; (B) “[Employee]
was fired because of his sexual orientation.”; (C) “[Employee] was fired because of both his
sex and his sexual orientation.”; (D) “[Employee] was not fired because of either his sex or his
sexual orientation.” Id. (emphasis added). Most respondents chose (B), not (C). Id. at 18. That
is, only very few people chose to describe the firing as resulting from both sex and sexual
orientation. Id. Mikhail and Tobia speculate that this “Both Factors” finding “is capturing
something about what makes for a good—or bad—explanation in this context, in addition to
something about meaning.” Id. at 21 n.64 (citing H. Paul Grice, Logic and Conversation, in 3
SYNTAX AND SEMANTICS 41 (Peter Cole & Jerry L. Morgan eds., 1975)). The facts-only
Abstract approach seems to aim at precisely the same thing—namely, finding the most apt
explanation. And in any controversial case, the statutory term at issue does not figure in the
single most apt explanation of the facts. For example, in Taniguchi v. Kan Pacific Saipan,
Ltd., 566 U.S. 560 (2012), if given the choice to describe the translator as “both an ‘interpreter’
and a ‘translator,’” most people would instead choose merely “translator” (i.e., they’d choose
the single most apt description—the same term they’d use when responding to a facts-only
Abstract question). See supra note 196. Similarly, in Smith v. United States, 508 U.S. 223
(1993), if given the choice to describe the trading of guns for narcotics as “both ‘using’ the gun
and ‘trading the gun for narcotics,’” most people would instead choose merely “trading the
gun for narcotics” (again, the most apt description, i.e., the one they’d provide in response to
a facts-only Abstract question). See supra note 228.
260 See supra note 163; see also Tobia & Mikhail, supra note 38, at 18 fig.3.
261 Bostock, 140 S. Ct. at 1745.
262 Compare id. (“[A]n employee who has just been fired is likely to identify the primary or
most direct cause rather than list literally every but-for cause. To do otherwise would be tiring
at best. But these conversational conventions do not control Title VII’s legal analysis, which
asks simply whether sex was a but-for cause.”), with id. at 1828 (Kavanaugh, J., dissenting)
(emphasizing the alleged importance of the majority’s concession regarding the employee’s
hypothetical conversational response to his or her friends), and Hively v. Ivy Tech Cmty.
Coll., 853 F.3d 339, 367, 370 (7th Cir. 2017) (en banc) (Sykes, J., dissenting) (insisting that
there is only one “real motivation for Ivy Tech’s decision,” and that the statute’s failure to
invoke its single-most-apt description—“sexual orientation”—dooms plaintiff’s case).
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A statute-only Abstract approach, in contrast, would move much
further from the factual context at issue. When interpreting a
statutory prohibition on vehicles in the park, it would ask, e.g.,
“What is an example of a vehicle?”263 When interpreting Title VII’s
sex discrimination provision, it would ask, “What is an example of
a person being fired because of their sex?” Unless the respondent’s
initial response is, e.g., “a baby stroller,” or, “a person getting fired
for being gay or lesbian,” those answers would not be treated as
falling under the ambit of the respective statutes. In effect, the
statute-only Abstract approach asks for only the prototypical
examples of the thing mentioned in the statute.264 In Bostock,
Justice Alito’s dissenting opinion leans heavily on a statute-only
Abstract approach to ordinary public meaning.265 He emphasizes,
for example, that what we now call transgender discrimination
would not “have crossed [the ordinary reader’s] mind” upon reading
the words in the statute266 without considering what that
enactment-era reader would have called it in the event that it had
As another example of Justice Kavanaugh arguably favoring an Abstract approach in
Bostock, consider his discussion of the “baby stroller” vehicles-in-the-park example mentioned
above to demonstrate “how ordinary meaning differs from literal meaning. A statutory ban
on ‘vehicles in the park’ would literally encompass a baby stroller. But no good judge would
interpret the statute that way because the word ‘vehicle,’ in its ordinary meaning, does not
encompass baby strollers.” Bostock, 140 S. Ct. at 1825 (Kavanaugh, J., dissenting). Justice
Kavanaugh’s argument here is ambiguous as between an Applied approach and an Abstract
approach, but his argument is more obviously true if one assumes an Abstract approach.
(That said, Kavanaugh appears to be correct that “‘vehicle,’ in its ordinary meaning, does not
encompass baby strollers” even if one adopts an Applied approach to ordinary meaning. Id.;
see Tobia, supra note 3, at 763–64 (demonstrating empirically that most people deny that a
baby stroller is a “vehicle”).
263 See Bostock, 140 S. Ct. at 1826 (Kavanaugh, J., dissenting) (“[I]n everyday speech
‘vehicle’ calls up the picture of a thing moving on land.” (quoting McBoyle v. United States,
283 U.S. 25, 26 (1931))); McBoyle, 283 U.S. at 27 (stating that because the term “vehicle . . .
evoke[s] in the common mind only the picture of vehicles moving on land,” the definition
should not be construed broadly to include other things like an “aircraft” (emphasis added)).
264 Previous scholarship in law and linguistics has focused on similar prototype-based
approaches to statutory interpretation. See, e.g., LAWRENCE SOLAN, THE LANGUAGE OF
STATUTES: LAWS AND THEIR INTERPRETATION 64–69 (2010) (discussing prototype-based
approaches to ordinary meaning interpretation); Hart, supra note 45, at 607 (discussing the
vehicles-in-the-park example and both the “core of settled meaning” and “penumbra of
debatable cases” that arise from general rules).
265 Bostock, 140 S. Ct. at 1767 (Alito, J., dissenting) (“In 1964, ordinary Americans reading
the text of Title VII would not have dreamed that discrimination because of sex meant
discrimination because of sexual orientation, much less gender identity.”).
266 Id.
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crossed her mind (i.e., without considering a facts-only Abstract
approach).267
Applied and Abstract approaches are each compatible with the
ambiguous notion of ordinary reader “understanding” (as well as
other popular, similarly ambiguous locutions).268 Yet they often
provide very different answers to the question of OPM in a given
case. 269 There is little pattern or consistency in judges’ adoption of

267 Cf. Eskridge et al., supra note 66, at 1550–58 (arguing that “sex” had a broader meaning
in 1964 than it does today).
268 These other ambiguous locutions include, for example, instances in which judges write
that an ordinary person “would not say that” X, without specifying the context imagined (e.g.,
whether the person is considering the applicability of X to the situation at hand [an Applied
approach], or instead whether the person is offering her first-most-apt description of the
situation [a facts-only Abstract approach]). See, e.g., Bostock, 140 S. Ct. at 1828 (Kavanaugh,
J., dissenting) (“[F]ew in 1964 (or today) would describe a firing because of sexual orientation
as a firing because of sex.” (emphasis added)); Milner v. Dep't of Navy, 562 U.S. 562, 577–78
(2011) (“We would not say, in ordinary parlance, that a ‘personnel file’ is any file an employee
uses, or that a ‘personnel department’ is any department in which an employee serves. No
more would we say that a ‘personnel rule or practice’ is any rule or practice that assists an
employee in doing her job.” (emphasis added)); Bostock, 140 S. Ct. at 1826 (Kavanaugh, J.,
dissenting) (citing Milner, 562 U.S. at 578, as an example of “[t]he Court rebuff[ing] a literal
reading of ‘personnel rules’”); Abramski v. United States, 573 U.S. 169, 196 (2014) (Scalia, J.,
dissenting) (arguing that a statute applicable to purchasers may not apply to the facts at
hand, concerning an agent who purchases on behalf of a principal: “[I]f I give my son $10 and
tell him to pick up milk and eggs at the store, no English speaker would say that the store
‘sells’ the milk and eggs to me.” (emphasis added)); Roberts v. Sea-Land Servs., Inc., 566 U.S.
93, 102 n.5 (2012) (“A person who slipped and fell on a negligently maintained sidewalk would
not say that she had been ‘awarded money damages’ if the business responsible for the
sidewalk voluntarily paid her hospital bills.” (emphasis added)); Jackson v. Birmingham Bd.
of Educ., 544 U.S. 167, 185 (2005) (Thomas, J., dissenting) (“[S]uppose a sexist air traffic
controller withheld landing permission for a plane because the pilot was a woman. While the
sex discrimination against the female pilot no doubt adversely impacted male passengers
aboard that plane, one would never say that they were discriminated against ‘on the basis of
sex’ by the controller’s action.” (emphasis added)).
269 See, e.g., Voisine v. United States, 136 S. Ct. 2272, 2278–80 (2016) (interpreting the
meaning of “use of force” in the context of merely reckless behavior). In Voisine, Justice Kagan
used an Applied approach and found the statute applicable:
[S]uppose a person throws a plate in anger against the wall near where his
wife is standing. That hurl counts as a ‘use’ of force even if the husband did
not know for certain (or have as an object), but only recognized a substantial
risk, that a shard from the plate would ricochet and injure his wife.
Id. at 2279 (emphasis added); see also id. (providing additional illustrations). In dissent,
Justice Thomas appeared to favor a statute-only Abstract approach, and therefore found the
statute inapplicable: “When a person talks about ‘using force’ against another, one thinks of
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a given approach from one case to another.270 Nor do judges
articulate any express justification for adopting whichever
approach they use in a given case.
Unfortunately, scholars likewise appear not to have attempted to
resolve
this
ambiguity
regarding
relevant
reader
“understanding.”271 John Manning, the foremost academic
proponent of textualism—and the most frequently quoted textualist
scholar in Bostock272—seems at times to assume the propriety of an
intentional acts—punching, kicking, shoving, or using a weapon.” Id. at 2284 (Thomas, J.,
dissenting); see also id. at 2284–85 (providing illustrations reflecting a facts-only Abstract
approach).
270 Justice Scalia, for example, adopted different types of approaches from case to case
without providing any explicit justification, seemingly without any principled or predictable
pattern. Compare, e.g., Loughrin v. United States, 573 U.S. 351, 367–69 (2014) (Scalia, J.,
concurring) (adopting an Applied approach, providing numerous hypothetical fact patterns
and asking, for each, whether an ordinary speaker would or would not agree that the statutory
language applied), with, e.g., Johnson v. United States, 529 U.S. 694, 718–19 (2000) (Scalia,
J., dissenting) (impliedly endorsing a facts-only Abstract approach: “[T]he acid test of whether
a word can reasonably bear a particular meaning is whether you could use the word in that
sense at a cocktail party without having people look at you funny.”).
That said, in any given case it’s possible that a judge employs one approach merely as a
means of obtaining evidence of the outcome of the other approach, the latter being the one
corresponding to the judge’s conception of OPM. This possibility makes it doubly challenging
to discern judges’ implicit conceptions of OPM. See infra Section IV.B (noting a similar
difficulty when interpreting judges’ statements implicating extratextual considerations).
271 Consider, for example, scholars’ responses to Judge Easterbrook’s opinion in United
States v. Marshall, 908 F.2d 1312, 1317 (7th Cir. 1990) (interpreting the reach of a statute
concerning a “mixture or substance containing a detectable amount” of LSD and reasoning
that “[o]rdinary parlance calls the paper containing tiny crystals of LSD a mixture”), aff’d sub
nom. Chapman v. United States, 500 U.S. 453 (1991). Compare, e.g., RICHARD L. HASEN, THE
JUSTICE OF CONTRADICTIONS: ANTONIN SCALIA AND THE POLITICS OF DISRUPTION 28 (2018)
(criticizing Judge Easterbrook’s opinion by asking, rhetorically, “What ordinary speaker of
English would refer to LSD-laced blotter paper as a ‘mixture’ of drug and paper?”), and Ian
Samuel, Textualism for Realists, 117 MICH. L. REV. 1085, 1094 (2019) (reviewing HASEN,
supra) (“That response, which I think is absolutely correct, sounds in textualism.”), with John
F. Manning, The Absurdity Doctrine, 116 HARV. L. REV. 2387, 2432, 2452–53 n.244 (2003)
[hereinafter Manning, The Absurdity Doctrine] (noting, with seeming approval, the Court’s
opinion affirming Judge Easterbrook’s decision on textualist grounds). Of course, Judge
Easterbrook may have been considering either an Applied or an Abstract approach, as may
Hasen, Samuel, and Manning. But much of the rhetorical force of the dueling positions comes
from assuming the propriety of an Applied approach in Easterbrook and Manning’s case and
assuming the propriety of an Abstract approach in Hasen and Samuel’s case.
272 See Bostock v. Clayton Cnty., 140 S. Ct. 1731, 1766–67 (2020) (Alito, J., dissenting) (first
citing John Manning, Textualism and the Equity of the Statute, supra note 228; then citing
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Applied approach. So, for example, he approvingly quotes Judge
Easterbrook’s claim that “[w]hen most of the relevant community
would agree on the meaning of a text as applied to a particular fact
situation, that text is considered clear in context.”273 Further
emphasizing the importance of interpreting words “in context,”
Manning explains that textualists ask how readers “would have
understood the statutory text, as applied to the problem before the
judge,”274 i.e., while “thinking about the same problem” the judge
faces.275
On the other hand, recent scholarship advocating the use of
corpus linguistics in statutory interpretation has tended to favor a
statute-only Abstract approach, which would ask about the sense or
application of the statute’s term that is “likely to be the one that
first comes to mind when [readers] think of [the statute’s] term.”276
These scholars, citing “the rationales that drive us to consider
ordinary meaning,” suggest that “[a] concern for fair notice and
protection of reliance interests may well direct us to stop at th[is]
top-of-mind sense of a statutory term” because “the first [sense] that
comes to mind . . . may be the sense that the public will have in mind
upon reading the terms of a statute.”277
In the end, while caselaw and scholarship are all over the map,
textualism’s underlying rationales probably favor an Applied

John Manning, What Divides Textualists from Purposivists?, supra note 1; and then citing
Manning, The Absurdity Doctrine, supra note 271); id. at 1825 (Kavanaugh, J., dissenting)
(citing Manning, The Absurdity Doctrine, supra note 271).
273 Manning, Textualism and the Equity of the Statute, supra note 228, at 17 & n.66
(emphasis added).
274 Manning, The Absurdity Doctrine, supra note 271, at 2458 (emphasis added) (citing
Frank H. Easterbrook, The Role of Original Intent in Statutory Construction, 11 HARV. J.L.
& PUB. POL'Y 59, 65 (1988)); see John F. Manning, Textualism and Legislative Intent, 91 VA.
L. REV. 419, 445 n.84 (2005) [hereinafter Manning, Textualism and Legislative Intent].
275 Manning, Textualism and Legislative Intent, supra note 274, at 420–21 (emphasis
added) (quoting Easterbrook, supra note 274, at 61).
276 Lee & Mouritsen, supra note 1, at 874 (contrasting this approach with a “broader,
‘reflective’ sense” that would reflect the fact that, “[i]f pressed, some people might concede
that the term encompasses” something else). But see Slocum & Gries, supra note 114, at 22,
25 (“Corpus-linguistic data provide nothing but frequencies,” and “frequency has been shown
to be not as good a measure of ‘commonness’ and ‘ease of accessibility in a speaker’s mind’ as
Lee and Mouritsen presuppose.”).
277 Lee & Mouritsen, supra note 1, at 874.
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approach to ordinary reader understanding.278 Consider the values
of “fair notice” and “protection of reliance interests”—both of which
the Bostock majority and dissents emphasize as reasons to focus on
ordinary meaning.279 As noted in the previous paragraph, some take
these values to favor a statute-only Abstract approach, on the
ground that such an approach produces a narrow, “top-of-mind”
reading of statutes.280 Granted, that reasoning might be compelling
in the criminal context where narrower readings systematically
favor defendants (though I doubt it’s compelling even there281). Still,
in non-criminal contexts like Title VII, fair notice and reliance
interests don’t favor a narrower or broader construal of a statute
per se; the employee and employer have roughly equal need for
notice of their rights and responsibilities.
Instead, what seems to matter for purposes of notice and reliance
is what would happen in the following sort of situation: An ordinary
person (whether employer or employee) is contemplating some
course of action (e.g., firing someone) or event (e.g., getting fired)

278 To be sure, textualists could simply say that whenever Applied and Abstract approaches
reach different outcomes, the text’s OPM is thereby rendered “unclear,” making recourse to
extratextual considerations necessary (i.e., putting interpreters in the “construction zone”
rather than the realm of “interpretation”). See Solum, The Interpretation-Construction
Distinction, supra note 255, at 100, 108. They would be unwilling to do so, however, because
this would render the text at issue in most disputed cases unclear. See infra Section IV.B.
279 See, e.g., Bostock v. Clayton Cnty., 140 S. Ct. 1731, 1738 (2020) (“If judges
could . . . remodel . . . statutory terms inspired only by extratextual sources and our own
imaginations, we would . . . deny the people the right to continue relying on the original
meaning of the law they have counted on . . . .”); id. at 1828 (Kavanaugh, J., dissenting) (“A
literalist approach to interpreting phrases . . . deprives the citizenry of fair notice of what the
law is.”); Lee & Mouritsen, supra note 1, at 874.
280 Lee & Mouritsen, supra note 1, at 874.
281 The more principled approach, in terms of fair notice and lenity, is to employ an Applied
approach but require greater clarity for criminal statutes than others. In any event, as a
matter of black-letter law, the rule of lenity applies only after one has determined that two or
more interpretations are in equipoise (at which point the tie favors the defendant). See 73
AM. JUR. 2D Statutes § 188 (2021) (“[T]he view has been followed that the rule of lenity is a
tie-breaking principle of relevance when two reasonable interpretations of the same provision
stand in relative equipoise.”). To make that equipoise determination, one must first decide
how to weigh the answer an Applied approach provides relative to the answer an Abstract
approach provides. To state the point more generally using the interpretation-construction
distinction: to determine what constructions are permissible, one must first determine the set
of interpretations that capture the text’s OPM. See Solum, The Interpretation-Construction
Distinction, supra note 255, at 106–07. It’s at that first, interpretation, stage that the choice
between Applied and Abstract approaches is typically decisive.
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and consults the statutory provision at issue. The question is: would
they understand that statutory provision to reach the course of
action or event contemplated? An Applied approach tracks that
ordinary reader’s answer. An Abstract approach, on the other hand,
will construe the statute much more narrowly than anticipated. The
ideal of “fair notice”—already tenuously connected to the modern
world of voluminous, often technical, law—becomes especially
strange if it is conceptualized as notice to someone without any
particular course of action or event in mind (as a statute-only
Abstract approach would have it), or without a particular law they
are consulting (as a facts-only Abstract approach would have it).282
And indeed, the very notion of “reliance interests” implies agents
who have considered the relevant law and its application to a
contemplated course of action or event—i.e., the sorts of ordinary
readers whose understanding the Applied approach tracks.
282 Cf. Bostock, 140 S. Ct. at 1828 (Kavanaugh, J., dissenting) (“[T]he ‘linchpin of statutory
interpretation is ordinary meaning, for that is going to be most accessible to the citizenry
desirous of following the law . . . .’” (second emphasis added) (first quoting ESKRIDGE,
INTERPRETING LAW, supra note 1, at 81; and then citing SCALIA, supra note 1, at 17)).
Two clarifications. First, this is not to say that it is natural, in ordinary cognition, to make
the sorts of binary yes-or-no judgments that the law requires, especially in cases dealing with
in-or-out categorization judgments. See Brian G. Slocum, Replacing the Flawed Chevron
Standard, 60 WM. & MARY L. REV. 195, 238–39 (2018) (explaining that a binary approach
conflicts with the natural tendency to categorize as “a matter of degree”). Second, if
textualism is in fact (as opposed to in its own professed impetuses) driven primarily by a
preference for rules over standards, as Caleb Nelson has suggested, then textualists may
prefer an Abstract approach insofar as it allows them to pick where to draw the cutoff line so
as to create bright-line rules. See Caleb Nelson, What is Textualism?, 91 VA. L. REV. 347, 350
(2005) (“[J]udges whom we think of as textualists have explicitly noted their relative affinity
for rules.”). Compare, e.g., County of Maui v. Haw. Wildlife Fund, 140 S. Ct. 1462, 1482–83
(2020) (Alito, J., dissenting) (faulting the majority for failing to craft a bright-line rule), and
id. at 1481 (Thomas, J., dissenting) (“As the Court acknowledges, its opinion gives almost no
guidance, save for a list of seven factors.”), and Bostock, 140 S. Ct. at 1761 (Alito, J.,
dissenting) (faulting the majority for “graft[ing] onto Title VII some arbitrary line separating
the things that are related closely enough [to ‘sex’] and those that are not,” rather than
providing a bright line rule), with, e.g., Maui, 140 S. Ct. at 1478 (Kavanaugh, J., concurring)
(declining to join Justices Thomas and Alito in dissent because “the statute does not establish
a bright-line test,” or, in other words, because “[t]he source of the vagueness is Congress’
statutory text”). But see, e.g., Manning, Textualism and Legislative Intent, supra note 274, at
424 (noting textualists’ emphasis on respecting the deal legislators struck, implicitly
including their use of broad or vague terms); Manning, The Absurdity Doctrine, supra note
271, at 2411–12 (“[T]extualists argue that if a judge curtails or extends the clear terms of a
statutory text, he or she risks disturbing a carefully wrought (and perhaps unrecorded)
legislative deal.”).
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Now, even if an Applied approach is better on fair notice and
reliance grounds, textualists might still worry that an Applied
approach sacrifices a different virtue of OPM-based textualism
emphasized in the Bostock dissents—namely, that textualism
“facilitates the democratic accountability of America’s elected
representatives for the laws they enact.”283 When citizens can
“ascertain the law by reading the words of the statute,” so this
theory goes, they can better hold legislators accountable for the laws
they pass.284 Let’s assume, as we did with the “fair notice” rationale,
that this “democratic accountability” rationale bears some
resemblance to how the world works.285 Does textualism’s
democratic accountability rationale favor a statute-only Abstract
approach to interpretation—an interpretation that limits statutes
to the “top-of-mind” applications citizens imagine upon reading the
words in the statute—rather than an Applied approach that
construes statutes more broadly?
Textualists’ “democratic accountability” rationale likely favors
neither approach over the other. The issue turns on how much
imagination one assumes citizens (and, as a result, legislators)
possess or should possess. So, for example, in Bostock Justice Alito
“imagine[s] this scene[:] . . . a group of average Americans” in 1964
“decide[s] to read the text of [Title VII] with the aim of writing or
calling their representatives in Congress and conveying their
approval or disapproval.”286 Justice Alito claims that they “would
not have dreamed” that its text applied to, say, discrimination
against transgender people.287 If true, this might indeed be
troubling for purposes of democratic accountability. But once one
dispenses with anachronistic labels like “transgender,” I’m not so
sure it’s true. In the terms that they might have used at the time,
the citizens’ hypothetical might have been: “What if someone born
male begins dressing and acting like a female and gets fired as a
result? Does the statute prohibit that?” Is that such an
unimaginable potential application for these concerned citizens to
have dreamed up? (Think of the dystopian expectations suggested
Bostock, 140 S. Ct. at 1825 (Kavanaugh, J., dissenting) (emphasis added).
Id.; see Macleod, supra note 14, at 980.
285 But see, e.g., CHRISTOPHER H. ACHEN & LARRY M. BARTELS, DEMOCRACY FOR REALISTS:
WHY ELECTIONS DO NOT PRODUCE RESPONSIVE GOVERNMENT (Tali Mendelberg ed., 2016).
286 140 S. Ct. at 1767 (Alito, J., dissenting).
287 Id.
283
284
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by Phyllis Schlafly with respect to the Equal Rights Amendment288
or fears of “death panels” under the Affordable Care Act.289
Concerned citizens are creative.290)
In any event, if Alito’s hypothetical citizens had considered the
matter, the data reported in Section II.B indicate that they would
have thought the statute’s plain language prohibited the employer’s
action—at least, if these concerned citizens had disregarded their
own preferences and any other irrelevant extratextual beliefs or
attitudes.
B. WHAT TYPES OF EXTRATEXTUAL INFORMATION ARE RELEVANT?

That last proviso raises the second ambiguity in textualists’
notion of ordinary reader understanding, which concerns the types
of extratextual information the ordinary reader treats as relevant
to her interpretive task. Note that what fundamentally matters
here isn’t so much whether one imagines that textualists’ “ordinary
reader” is especially well-informed (or in any event has firm beliefs,
whether true or false) about drafting history, public opinion, public
expectations, or other matters outside the statute’s text. Instead, for
present purposes what matters is whether those sorts of
considerations affect her understanding of the statute’s language.
The question, in other words, concerns what extratextual factors
she treats as relevant to interpreting statutes, regardless of how
informed or uninformed one imagines her to be.

See MARJORIE J. SPRUILL, DIVIDED WE STAND: THE BATTLE OVER WOMEN’S RIGHTS AND
FAMILY VALUES THAT POLARIZED AMERICAN POLITICS 102–104 (2017) (discussing how
Schlafly and others exploited the public’s fears to campaign against the Equal Rights
Amendment).
289 See Brendan Nyhan, Why the “Death Panel” Myth Wouldn’t Die: Misinformation in the
Health Care Reform Debate, 8 FORUM, no. 1, 2010, at 1. On the possibility of systematically
undesirable interpretations, generated by the combination of (a) ordinary folks’ expectations
and (b) ordinary folks’ negative attitudes toward Congress and/or opposition to particular
legislation, see infra note 308 and accompanying text.
290 Note also that the “democratic accountability” rationale can’t require that Congress
consider and articulate all intended applications in the text of statutes that would otherwise
be more vaguely worded. Such a requirement would go against textualists’ firm emphasis on
honoring the deal Congress strikes as evidenced by the text it enacts, including when it adopts
broad or vague language. See Manning, Textualism and Legislative Intent, supra note 274, at
424.
288
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Myriad sub-questions about particular types of information,
beliefs, and preferences quickly arise. Table 1 provides some
examples. The point isn’t to answer each of the questions raised, but
rather to appreciate how much room there is for divergent answers
to lead to divergent interpretations of a text’s OPM.
TABLE 1: Does textualism’s “ordinary reader” consider . . .
. . . consequences If so, then how extensive is her prediction
of each possible
of the legal consequences? Does she
interpretation?
consider the ramifications for the
development of entire bodies of law? Only
for the parties in the case at hand? And
how accurate must her prediction be? Can
she be influenced by popular
misunderstandings?291
. . . the public’s
If so, can these preferences stem from
preferences?292
factually incorrect beliefs?
. . . the public’s
If so, can these expectations stem from
application
factually incorrect beliefs? From the
expectations?
public’s wishful, pessimistic, or otherwise
biased thinking? From their cynical view
of Congress’s expectations, preferences,
intent, or purposes? From predictions of
how judges would interpret the language?
. . . the intent or
If so, what sort of extratextual evidence of
purpose of the
intent or purpose might she consider?
language’s
Must it be accurate? Widely-accessible?
enactment?
Actually widely accessed? Widely
understood? Can it include legislative
history?

291 Textualists appear for the most part to posit an ordinary reader who is not influenced
by her own false beliefs. Cf. Solum, Triangulating Public Meaning, supra note 32, at 1637–
38 (explaining that “original expected applications” can be “evidence of original public
meaning” but can be “incorrect” when, for example, “the expectation was based on a false
belief about the facts”). But it’s unclear whether the ordinary reader can be influenced by her
knowledge of the public’s widely shared false beliefs.
292 Textualists’ ordinary reader disregards her “personal preferences regarding the
outcome” of the interpretive dispute. SCALIA & GARNER, supra note 2, at 33. But again, it’s
unclear whether the ordinary reader can be influenced by her knowledge of the public’s widely
shared preferences.
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The Bostock opinions display the sorts of confusion that this
second ambiguity fosters. Justice Gorsuch’s majority opinion
purports to foreswear reliance on extratextual information
altogether.293 Justice Alito’s dissenting opinion likewise implies that
nothing outside the text is needed to reach the correct
interpretation.294 Still, Justice Alito goes on to emphasize that
textualists ought to consider far more by way of extratextual
information than does Justice Gorsuch.295 Alito focuses on the
importance of “societal norms,” such as society’s views about the
(im)morality of gay or transgender people.296 But it’s unclear why
such attitudes would, on Alito’s view, appropriately affect
reasonable ordinary readers’ understanding of the text. (Is it
because they would have shed light on congressional intent,
purpose, or expectations? On public expectations? Public
preferences?297) That said, even if Justice Alito doesn’t explain
exactly why these norms are relevant, his explicit mention of
extratextual influences is at least more informative than judges’
typical practice of leaving the entire topic implicitly to their
audience’s imagination.
Unfortunately, textualist scholarship provides surprisingly little
guidance here, too. John Manning’s work, as both dissenting
opinions emphasize, notes the relevance of “context” for properly
understanding statutory language.298 But the types of relevant
293 E.g., Bostock v. Clayton Cnty., 140 S. Ct. 1731, 1737 (2020) (“When the express terms
of a statute give us one answer and extratextual considerations suggest another, it’s no
contest. Only the written word is the law . . . .”).
294 E.g., id. at 1774 (Alito, J., dissenting) (“Even if we totally disregard the societal norms
of 1964, the text of Title VII does not support the Court’s holding.”).
295 See, e.g., id. at 1767 (“[W]hen textualism is properly understood, it calls for an
examination of the social context in which a statute was enacted . . . .”).
296 Id. at 1769.
297 Moreover, when judges appear to describe completely unidealized, actual people who
had opinions about the statute at the time of its enactment, it’s often unclear whether judges
are doing so because such people’s actually-held, unidealized views reflect (the judge’s
conception of) OPM, or merely because people’s actually-held, unidealized views provide
evidence of how a reasonable reader would have understood the text (e.g., without believing
falsehoods, without being swayed by media portrayals of statutory purpose, etc.)—the latter
reflecting the judge’s conception of OPM. This makes it doubly difficult to discern judges’
conceptions of OPM with respect to the extratextual information issue.
298 See Bostock, 140 S. Ct. at 1766–67 (Alito, J., dissenting) (“[S]tatutes convey meaning
only because members of a relevant linguistic community apply shared background
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“context” are tricky to pin down. Justice Alito quotes at length from
Manning’s article, What Divides Textualists from Purposivists?,
emphasizing that, as Manning writes, “[o]ne can make sense of
others’ communications only by placing them in their appropriate
social and linguistic context.”299 But as Manning makes clear in the
same article, where the text is clear as a matter of “semantic usage,”
“contextual evidence that relates to questions of policy,” such as
“public knowledge of the mischief the lawmakers sought to address”
is irrelevant.300 What, then, counts as “appropriate social context”
according to textualists? It remains unclear.301
Nor have OPM-based constitutional originalists offered much
guidance; even the most careful accounts of OPM contain only vague
assertions about proper and improper extratextual considerations

conventions for understanding how particular words are used in particular contexts.”
(alteration in original) (quoting Manning, The Absurdity Doctrine, supra note 271, at 2457));
id. at 1825 (Kavanaugh, J., dissenting) (“[S]tatutory interpretation asks ‘how a reasonable
person, conversant with the relevant social and linguistic conventions, would read the text in
context.’” (quoting Manning, The Absurdity Doctrine, supra note 271, at 2392–93)).
299 Id. at 1766 (Alito, J., dissenting) (emphasis added) (quoting Manning, What Divides
Textualists from Purposivists?, supra note 1, at 79–80).
300 Manning, What Divides Textualists from Purposivists?, supra note 1, at 92–93 (emphasis
added); see also Manning, Textualism and Legislative Intent, supra note 274, at 424–25
(“[Textualists] subscribe to the general principle that texts should be taken at face value . . .
even if the legislation will then have an awkward relationship to the apparent background
intention or purpose that produced it.”).
301 Consider the following candidate for a piece of “appropriate,” i.e., relevant, “social
context,” taken from Alito’s Bostock dissent: “[D]iscrimination because of sexual orientation
is not historically tied to a project that aims to subjugate either men or women,” and is
therefore not “sexist.” 140 S. Ct. at 1765. Assuming that’s true, why is it relevant? Because it
bears on “public knowledge of the mischief [Congress] sought to address,” i.e., sexism (in
which case Manning would not deem it relevant), or instead because it is “contextual evidence
of semantic usage” that shows what the words “sex” and “discrimination” meant when they
appeared together in the statute (in which case he would deem it relevant)? See Manning,
What Divides Textualists from Purposivists?, supra note 1, at 93. These sorts of distinctions—
between evidence of “semantic meaning” (good) and evidence of anything else (bad)—are often
extremely difficult to draw in any principled manner. Nor is the more generally worded
distinction between relevant and irrelevant extratextual “context” a subject that has received
sustained attention in Manning’s or in other textualists’ work. See, e.g., Manning, What
Divides Textualists from Purposivists?, supra note 1, at 110 (explaining that “[t]extualists of
course believe that language has meaning only in context,” and that “[t]his recognition
requires them routinely to consult extratextual sources,” but noting, with respect to those
extratextual sources, that only “in cases of ambiguity, [are] textualists . . . even willing to
treat indicia of purpose as legitimate parts of the relevant context” (emphasis added)).

Published by Digital Commons @ University of Georgia School of Law, 2022

75

Georgia Law Review, Vol. 56, Iss. 1 [2022], Art. 2

76

GEORGIA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 56:1

for purposes of determining ordinary reader understanding.302 And
even if constitutional originalists were to flesh out a more robust
account, there are a number of reasons why statutory textualists
might decide to adopt a divergent conception.303
302 Originalist theorists like Larry Solum, for example, have given careful accounts of
“public meaning.” E.g., Solum, Originalist Methodology, supra note 3, at 275–76; Lawrence
B. Solum, Communicative Content and Legal Content, 89 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 479, 497–98
(2013). But the resulting conceptions of it are, as Richard Fallon has noted, “strikingly openended.” Fallon, supra note 1, at 1267. This is understandable given their focus on offering an
account of “public meaning” that distinguishes it from other types of meaning addressed in
theoretical linguistics and the philosophy of language. Still, the result is that many more
specific, and outcome-determinative, questions concerning the potential relevance of various
types of extratextual information remain unanswered. See id.; SLOCUM, supra note 23, at 5–
10, 21–26 (discussing accounts of meaning developed by Scott Soames, Lawrence Solum, and
Andrei Marmor); see also Andrei Marmor, Introduction to PHILOSOPHICAL FOUNDATIONS OF
LANGUAGE IN THE LAW 8 (Andrei Marmor & Scott Soames eds., 2011) (discussing various
factors involved in understanding “the ordinary meaning of the language in its textual
context”). So, for example, Larry Solum explains that the “context of constitutional
communication” is relevant to finding the OPM of the Constitution’s text. Solum, The Fixation
Thesis, supra note 3, at 28–29. That “context” is comprised of “publicly available” information,
likely including “facts about the American Revolution, experience under the Articles of
Confederation, and the general shape of the common law legal regime in effect throughout
the United States.” Id. But it isn’t possible to infer from this cursory non-exhaustive list what
an analogous full list of relevant contextual considerations would look like for a statute such
as the Civil Rights Act of 1964.
303 While some OPM constitutional originalists explicitly posit a hypothetical reader who,
they emphasize, is “objective” and fully informed as to all publicly available ratification-era
information, others appear to favor a somewhat less idealized hypothetical reader. See
Mulligan, supra note 129, at 406 (describing “reasonable person” standards for constitutional
interpretation); see also Thomas B. Colby, The Sacrifice of the New Originalism, 99 GEO. L.J.
713, 724 (2011) (describing the evolution of originalists’ ideal reader). But there are three
interconnected reasons why originalists may be attracted to a less-idealized ordinary reader
conception of OPM, while textualists might prefer a more idealized conception. First, for
constitutional originalists, the decision to opt for a less idealized ordinary reader may often
be premised on the normative significance of constitutional ratification—a consideration
absent in statutory interpretation. In other words, originalists might have special reasons to
care what ratifiers actually happened to think (even if it was in some sense uninformed or
biased). See Solum, Originalist Methodology, supra note 3, at 275 (discussing the
Constitution’s “complex process of authorship intended to make the communicative content
of the constitutional text accessible to the public at the time the text went through the
ratification process”). Second, a less idealized conception of the ordinary reader might also be
less fraught in the constitutional context because the text is relatively short and the attention
paid to it relatively great, compared to modern statutes, perhaps decreasing the degree of
ignorance among its enactment-era lay readers. Third, the infrequency of constitutional
ratification may make enactment-era laypeople’s implicit methods of constitutional
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In the end, most textualist scholarship and judicial rhetoric
suggests that the ordinary reader test resembles Justice Gorsuch’s
low-extratextual-information approach.304 After all, the alternative
approach threatens to render textualism incoherent by turning the
“ordinary reader” test (and, therefore, “public meaning”-based
interpretation) into merely an alternative entry point for the same
sorts of considerations that characterize non-textualist methods of
interpretation (e.g., considerations of the legislature’s or public’s
preferences, expectations, purposes, intent, and so forth).
Textualists emphasize that such considerations render otherwise
clear text amenable to an unacceptably diverse set of contradictory
interpretations, making easy cases hard.305 They portray the
ordinary reader test as a means of avoiding extratextual
considerations like statutory purpose, instead focusing on a
commonsense understanding of language;306 the surrounding text—
not, e.g., popular beliefs about congressional intent or statutory
purpose—provides the relevant context. (Moreover, imagine the
alternative for a moment in light of the fact that popular beliefs
about the content of new legislation are often premised on fear and

interpretation more palatable as a relevant consideration, whereas pegging statutory
interpretation to laypeople’s implicit interpretive methods at the time of statutes’ passage
might result in an extreme patchwork of interpretive approaches across many different
statutes enacted at different times.
The upshot is that even if constitutional originalists were to provide a comprehensive list
of relevant extratextual considerations (i.e., the list discussed at the end of the previous
footnote), it’s not obvious that it would be instructive for purposes of statutory interpretation.
But see supra note 1 (noting textualists’ and originalists’ seemingly universal assumption
that “public meaning” refers to the same type of meaning in both statutory and constitutional
interpretation).
304 See John F. Manning, Competing Presumptions About Statutory Coherence, 74
FORDHAM L. REV. 2009, 2010 (2006) (discussing Justice Scalia’s view that “judges should hew
closely to the semantic import of what Congress as a whole has been able to agree upon”).
305 E.g., SCALIA & GARNER, supra note 2, at xxvii–iii (noting “uncertainty and confusion”
resulting from a lack of clear “interpretive conventions”); Manning, Justice Scalia and the
Idea of Judicial Restraint, supra note 10, at 750 (explaining how a “text-based approach”
limits judges’ individual discretion); Grove, supra note 53, at 270 (explaining how textualism
can constrain judges).
306 E.g., Barrett, supra note 2, at 2203 (characterizing textualists’ use of dictionary
definitions as aiming to ascertain the “meaning attributed to words by ordinary English
speakers”).
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cynicism about Congress.307 An “ordinary reader” test that
privileges ordinary people’s cynical assumptions about
congressional intent could result in the systematic adoption of the
public’s most-feared, least-favored outcomes—effectively treating
statutes as the product of “[un]reasonable persons pursuing
[un]reasonable purposes [un]reasonably.”308)
Still, many scholars discussing OPM do posit a reasonable
ordinary reader influenced by at least some extratextual
considerations.309 The problem remains: which ones? Without more
clarity, this second ambiguity in textualists’ conception of OPM will
continue to undermine claims of empirical determinacy in cases
where textualists assert that the text is clear. In other words,
dissensus might continue, even if all of the empirical facts are
known, because textualists might disagree about which facts are
relevant to determining a text’s OPM.310

V. CONCLUSION
The Bostock litigation illustrates the sort of interpretive conflict
that increasingly typifies our textualist era. The ordinary meaning
of a few common words becomes the fulcrum of largescale social and
political division. Judges, conscious of their limited mandate,
consider “how the ordinary user of the English language might
understand that statutory language”311 and give the resulting
“commonsense” understanding dispositive effect,312 thereby
purportedly acting as “agents of the people.”313

See, e.g., Congress and the Public, GALLUP, https://news.gallup.com/poll/1600/CongressPublic.aspx (last visited Nov. 6, 2021) (noting that, as of September 2021, 69% of respondents
polled disapproved of the way Congress is handling its job, and 62% had very little or no
confidence in Congress); Nyhan, supra note 289, at 1 (providing examples of misinformation
playing on public fears regarding health care reform).
308 Cf. HENRY M. HART JR. & ALBERT M. SACKS, THE LEGAL PROCESS: BASIC PROBLEMS IN
THE MAKING AND APPLICATION OF LAW 1378 (William N. Eskridge Jr. & Philip P. Frickey
eds., 1995) (contending that statutes should be construed as if drafted by “reasonable persons
pursuing reasonable purposes reasonably”).
309 See, e.g., Manning, What Divides Textualists from Purposivists?, supra note 1, at 110.
310 Cf. Grove, supra note 53, at 281–85 (describing how the majority and dissenting
Justices’ relied on different considerations to interpret Title VII in Bostock).
311 Kavanaugh, supra note 2, at 2150 n.158.
312 Scalia & Manning, supra note 7, at 1610.
313 Barrett, supra note 2, at 2195.
307
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By actually obtaining evidence of ordinary readers’
understanding, this Article followed the logic and rhetoric of
textualist judges and scholars where it led. In Bostock, it led to
evidence supporting the employees’ enactment-era OPM claims and
undermining the employers’ contrary claims. In the process, the
Article’s experimental approach brought to light two important
ambiguities in judges’ and scholars’ conceptions of OPM. Without
positing any bad faith, it demonstrated how textualists’ implicit,
case-by-case resolution of those ambiguities currently facilitates a
less constrained, less transparent, and less principled interpretive
methodology than many textualists appear to realize. Finally, this
Article suggested how textualists ought to resolve each ambiguity if
they want to preserve textualism’s coherence and honor its
normative commitments.
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